HSCI 180 · Lesson 11

Drug Control and the War on Drugs

Drugs and Society

Learning objectives for this lesson:

  1. Describe how the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909 and the Hague International Opium Convention of 1912 began international drug control, and Canada's part in them.
  2. Compare the 1961, 1971 and 1988 United Nations drug conventions by the substances they cover and the obligations they impose, including the possession clause of the 1988 Convention.
  3. Explain how substances are scheduled internationally and in Canada, naming the roles of the WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the International Narcotics Control Board, UNODC, the federal Cabinet and the Minister of Health.
  4. Assess the claim that the consensus behind the drug conventions has fractured, using Bolivia's coca reservation, Canada's legalization of cannabis and the 2020 cannabis vote.
  5. Trace the war on drugs in the United States and Canada, including the crack and powder cocaine disparity and Canada's mandatory minimum penalties from 2012 to 2022, and calculate a quantity ratio.
  6. Describe how Canadian criminal law responds to people who possess drugs, and calculate and interpret representation ratios for Black and Indigenous people in Canadian drug enforcement and federal custody.
  7. Explain the human rights concerns raised by violent drug campaigns and the death penalty for drug offences, using the International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy.
  8. Evaluate the evidence on drug treatment courts and police diversion, including Mitchell et al. (2012), Csete and Tomasini-Joshi (2015), Collins et al. (2017) and Canadian evaluations.
  9. Explain how enforcement affects drug prices, purity, violence and displacement, calculate a purity-adjusted price, and apply the iron law of prohibition to the shift toward fentanyl.

This course was developed by Dr. Kiffer G. Card.

Lesson 11 · HSCI 180

Drug Control and the War on Drugs

A short guided walkthrough before you work through the lesson at your own pace.

Drugs and Society
Why this lesson

Two facts every drug policy debate meets

The treaties

Canada is a party to three UN drug conventions that limit drugs to medical and scientific purposes.

The record of enforcement

Decades of policing, sentencing and imprisonment have had uneven costs and measurable effects on drug markets.

The road map

Four sections

1 · International drug control

Treaties from 1909 to 1988 and the bodies that schedule drugs.

2 · The war on drugs

Scheduling and sentencing in the United States and Canada.

3 · Policing, race and rights

Disparities, human rights, drug courts and diversion.

4 · Markets and the iron law

Prices, purity, violence, displacement and potency.

Your tools

Calculate, sort and explore

Calculators

Quantity ratio, representation ratio and purity-adjusted price.

Interactives

Who does what, where alternatives act, and an illustrative market.

Real cases

Treaty votes, court data and Canadian toxicology reports.

Before you begin

Content and language

  • Sections 2 to 4 open with a content note and support lines, including the 9-8-8 Suicide Crisis Helpline.
  • "War on drugs" is used as a historical policy term.
  • The lesson uses person-first language, such as "people who use drugs."
Section 1 of 5

The International Drug Control System

⏱ Estimated reading time: 40 minutes
Section 1 of 5

The International Drug Control System

From the Shanghai Opium Commission to a fracturing consensus.

About 40 minutes
The beginnings

Shanghai and The Hague

1909: Shanghai Opium Commission

Thirteen countries; Canada represented by Mackenzie King; non-binding resolutions.

1912: Hague Opium Convention

The first drug control treaty; adds cocaine and heroin to opium and morphine.

The UN conventions

Three treaties at the core

1961 Single Convention

Medical and scientific purposes only; four schedules; creates the INCB.

1971 Psychotropic Substances

Amphetamines, hallucinogens, barbiturates and benzodiazepines.

1988 Illicit Traffic

Trafficking, money laundering, precursors and a possession offence.

The possession clause

A firm rule with some room

"Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each Party shall ... establish as a criminal offence ... the possession ... for personal consumption."1988 Convention, Article 3(2)

All three conventions also allow alternatives to conviction or punishment for people who use drugs.

Scheduling

Who decides what is controlled

WHO ECDD

Reviews evidence and recommends.

CND

53 states vote on schedules.

INCB

Monitors licit trade and compliance.

Canada

Cabinet and the Minister of Health amend CDSA schedules.

A fracturing consensus

Three signs of divergence

27 to 25CND vote removing cannabis from Schedule IV, December 2020
  • Bolivia rejoined the Single Convention with a coca reservation in 2013.
  • The INCB called Canada's Cannabis Act a treaty violation in 2018.
  • An earlier analysis found agreement on much of the system and divergence on non-medical use (Bewley-Taylor, 2012).
Carry forward

From treaties to enforcement

The conventions set obligations; governments decide how hard to enforce them.

Next: the war on drugs in the United States and Canada, and Calculator 11.1.

Introduction

Lesson 2 followed Canadian drug law from the Opium Act of 1908 to the Le Dain Commission and closed with a reminder that international treaties limited the choices open to Canada. This lesson turns to that international system and to what happened when governments set out to enforce it. Section 1 describes the treaties and the bodies that decide which substances are controlled. Section 2 follows the "war on drugs" in the United States and Canada, Section 3 examines policing, incarceration, race and human rights, and Section 4 asks what enforcement does to drug markets.

At the start of the twentieth century, governments and state monopolies traded opium across borders (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2008). A century later, nearly every country had agreed to limit a long list of substances to medical and scientific purposes. This section explains how that system was built, how it works and why its consensus has weakened.

Learning Objectives

  • 1.1 Describe how the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909 and the Hague International Opium Convention of 1912 began international drug control, and Canada's part in them.
  • 2.1 Compare the 1961, 1971 and 1988 United Nations drug conventions by the substances they cover and the obligations they place on governments.
  • 3.1 Explain how a substance is placed under international control, naming the roles of the World Health Organization's Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the International Narcotics Control Board and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
  • 3.2 Explain how substances are scheduled in Canada under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, including the 2026 pathway for precursor chemicals.
  • 4.1 Use Bolivia's coca reservation, Canada's legalization of cannabis and the December 2020 cannabis vote to assess the claim that the consensus behind the conventions has fractured.

1.1 From Shanghai to The Hague, 1909 to 1912

Lesson 2 described the British opium trade with China and the Opium Wars. By the early 1900s, China's government was trying to suppress opium smoking, anti-opium campaigners were pressing for international action, and China supported the idea of an international conference (UNODC, 2008).

1.1.1 The Shanghai Opium Commission

Charles Henry Brent, the Episcopal bishop of the Philippines, persuaded the United States State Department to call an international conference on the opium trade, and it met in Shanghai in February 1909 (UNODC, 2008). The Canada Year Book 1909 records that the International Opium Commission sat from 1 to 26 February under Brent's presidency. Thirteen countries took part, among them Great Britain, the United States, China, Japan, France, Germany and Russia (UNODC, 2008). Canada attended as part of the British delegation. A United States diplomatic letter of 1908 lists "Mr. Mackenzie King ... representing Canada" among the British commissioners, and the Canada Year Book 1909 states that Canada was represented by Mackenzie King, M.P. (United States Department of State, 1908). Lesson 2 described how King's report of July 1908 led to Canada's Opium Act, passed that year, a few months before the commission met.

The delegates acted in an advisory capacity only, because several governments refused to give the commission power to bind them (UNODC, 2008). Its resolutions recommended that each government take measures for "the gradual suppression of opium smoking in its own territories and possessions" and prevent shipments of opium to countries that prohibited its import (Canada Year Book 1909). UNODC (2008) treats the Shanghai meeting as the starting point of the international drug control system because it was the first time the situation in producing and consuming countries was analyzed together.

1.1.2 The Hague International Opium Convention

On 23 January 1912, representatives of China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Persia, Russia, the United Kingdom and other governments signed the International Opium Convention at The Hague (UNODC, 2009). UNODC (2008) describes it as the first international drug control treaty. Beyond opium and morphine, it covered two newer substances, cocaine and heroin; heroin had become available as a pharmaceutical product only in 1898 and was first marketed as a non-addictive alternative to morphine (UNODC, 2009). The Convention entered into force in five countries three years after its signing and gained near-universal membership after 1919, when the countries that signed the peace treaties ending the First World War also became parties to it (UNODC, 2009). UNODC (2008) describes the United States Harrison Act, which it says is largely viewed as the foundation of twentieth-century American drug policy, as a direct result of the Convention.

1.1.3 The League of Nations Conventions

Between the two world wars, the League of Nations developed three main conventions, in 1925, 1931 and 1936 (UNODC, 2008). They built the machinery of control, including an "estimates and statistics" system in which governments estimated their medical needs for narcotic drugs in advance. The 1925 Convention created the Permanent Central Board, and the 1931 Convention created the Drug Supervisory Body; both are forerunners of today's International Narcotics Control Board (UNODC, 2008). The 1931 Convention also introduced the idea of schedules: lists of substances that receive different levels of control (UNODC, 2008). Figure 11.1 places these agreements on a timeline with the United Nations treaties and the events discussed at the end of this section.

1909Shanghai OpiumCommission:13 countries meet 1912Hague OpiumConvention addscocaine, heroin 1925 to 1936League of Nationsconventions; firstschedules (1931) 1961Single Convention:medical, scientificpurposes only 1971Convention onPsychotropicSubstances 1988Illicit TrafficConvention; apossession offence 2012 to 2013Bolivia leaves andrejoins with a cocareservation 2018 to 2020Canada legalizescannabis; cannabisleaves Schedule IV Teal: building the system. Red: signs of a fracturing consensus.
Figure 11.1. Milestones in international drug control from the Shanghai Opium Commission (1909) to the removal of cannabis from Schedule IV of the Single Convention (2020), drawn from UNODC (2008, 2009, 2013), the International Narcotics Control Board (2018a, 2018b) and UN News (2020).

By the Second World War, the basic tools of control were in place: binding treaties, schedules, estimates of medical need and a monitoring board. The United Nations inherited and consolidated them.

2.1 The Three United Nations Conventions

After 1945, drug control passed to the United Nations. Three conventions now form the core of the system, and in 2016 the UN General Assembly, Canada included, reaffirmed them as "the cornerstone of the international drug control system" (International Narcotics Control Board [INCB], 2018a). Table 11.1 summarizes what each convention covers and requires.

Table 11.1. The three United Nations drug control conventions compared by date, scope and main obligations.

ConventionAdopted and in forceWhat it coversMain obligations
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (amended by a 1972 Protocol)Adopted in 1961; in force 13 December 1964Opium and opiates, coca leaf and cocaine, cannabis, and synthetic opioidsLimit production, trade, use and possession to medical and scientific purposes (Article 4); four schedules; penal provisions (Article 36)
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971Adopted in Vienna in 1971; in force August 1976Synthetic drugs such as amphetamine-type stimulants, hallucinogens including LSD, barbiturates and benzodiazepinesControls on manufacture and trade, tiered across four schedules
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988Adopted in Vienna in December 1988; in force 11 November 1990Trafficking, money laundering and the chemicals used to make drugs (precursors)Make trafficking a criminal offence (Article 3(1)); make possession for personal consumption a criminal offence, subject to constitutional principles (Article 3(2)); control precursors (Article 12)

Sources: UNODC (2008); United Nations (1988).

2.1.1 The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961

By 1961, nine overlapping international agreements on narcotic drugs were in force. After 13 years of negotiation, the Single Convention replaced almost all of them; it entered into force on 13 December 1964 (UNODC, 2008). Its central provision, Article 4(c), commits parties to limit "exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs" (UNODC, 2008). It expanded the schedules from two to four, created the International Narcotics Control Board and extended control to the cultivation of the opium poppy, the coca bush and the cannabis plant (UNODC, 2008).

The Single Convention also set out to end long-established practices. It prohibited opium smoking and eating, coca-leaf chewing and the non-medical use of cannabis, giving countries 15 years to end the quasi-medical use of opium and 25 years to end coca-leaf chewing and cannabis use (UNODC, 2008). This clause later became a point of conflict. The penal article, Article 36, requires each party, "subject to its constitutional limitations," to make cultivation, production, possession, sale and trade contrary to the Convention "punishable offences" and to punish serious offences with imprisonment. UNODC (2008) notes that the use of drugs itself is not mentioned in Article 36.

2.1.2 The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971

The Single Convention dealt mainly with plant-based drugs. In the 1950s and 1960s, synthetic drugs raised new concerns: Japan experienced a methamphetamine epidemic after the Second World War, and the use of amphetamines and LSD spread in Europe and North America (UNODC, 2008). Pharmaceutical companies argued for light controls, and the treaty was a compromise (UNODC, 2008). The 1971 Convention placed amphetamine-type stimulants, hallucinogens, barbiturates, benzodiazepines and some analgesics under control. Controls are tiered: most benzodiazepines are in Schedule IV, the least restrictive (UNODC, 2008).

2.1.3 The 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic

Delegations from 106 states met in Vienna from 25 November to 20 December 1988 and adopted a third treaty aimed at trafficking and organized crime; it entered into force on 11 November 1990 (UNODC, 2008). Where the 1961 Convention had required "punishable offences," the 1988 Convention requires "criminal offences" (UNODC, 2008). It added obligations on money laundering, extradition and precursor chemicals, which are listed in two tables monitored by the International Narcotics Control Board (United Nations, 1988). Its most debated clause concerns people who use drugs. Article 3(2) states:

"Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption ..." (United Nations, 1988, Article 3(2)).

UNODC (2008) describes this provision as going beyond the earlier conventions and as "a controversial stipulation for some countries." The box below shows that the same treaties also leave room for responses other than punishment.

Room for alternatives inside the treaties

All three conventions allow parties to provide measures such as education, rehabilitation, social reintegration, treatment and aftercare “as alternatives to conviction or punishment”: the 1961 and 1971 Conventions for people who use drugs and have committed drug offences, and the 1988 Convention both “in appropriate cases of a minor nature” and for any offence of possession for personal use (Single Convention, Article 36(1)(b); 1971 Convention, Article 22(1)(b); 1988 Convention, Article 3(4)(c) and (d); Csete & Tomasini-Joshi, 2015). These clauses are the legal basis for the drug treatment courts and police diversion programs in Section 3, and the phrase "subject to its constitutional principles" is part of the debate over decriminalization that Lesson 12 develops.

The conventions therefore combine a firm rule on supply with some flexibility toward people who possess drugs for their own use. The next question is who decides which substances fall under these rules.

3.1 Who Decides What Is Controlled

A substance is under international control when it is listed in a schedule of the 1961 or 1971 Convention, or, for a precursor, in a table of the 1988 Convention. Four international bodies share this work. Figure 11.2 traces the path a substance follows, and Table 11.2 summarizes each body's role.

1. WHO ExpertCommittee on DrugDependencereviews and recommends 2. Commission onNarcotic Drugs53 member statesvote on the change 3. Schedules of the1961 or 1971Conventionare amended 4. Each party actsin national law; inCanada, through theCDSA schedules Monitoring and supportInternational Narcotics Control Board (13 members):licit supply, precursors and treaty complianceUN Office on Drugs and Crime: supports the Commission
Figure 11.2. How a substance is placed under international control and then under national control, based on the World Health Organization (n.d.), UNODC (n.d.), the INCB (n.d.) and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act; the dashed arrow shows monitoring.

The WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD) is a group of independent experts that reviews the evidence on a substance and recommends whether it should be controlled (World Health Organization, n.d.). The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), created by the UN Economic and Social Council in 1946, has 53 member states and decides on the scope of control under the three conventions (UNODC, n.d.); in March 2025, for example, it approved WHO recommendations to control several new substances (World Health Organization, n.d.).

The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is an independent, quasi-judicial body of 13 members, three of them nominated by the World Health Organization, that monitors the licit drug trade and governments' compliance with the treaties (INCB, n.d.). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), governed by the Commission since 1991, assists governments and publishes data on illicit markets, including the World Drug Report (UNODC, 2008, n.d.).

Table 11.2. The four international bodies of drug control and what each one does.

BodyMembershipMain role
WHO Expert Committee on Drug DependenceIndependent scientific expertsReviews evidence and recommends whether to control a substance
Commission on Narcotic Drugs53 member statesVotes on scheduling; governs UNODC
International Narcotics Control Board13 members elected for five yearsMonitors licit supply, precursors and compliance
United Nations Office on Drugs and CrimeUN secretariat officeAssists governments; reports on illicit markets

Sources: World Health Organization (n.d.); UNODC (n.d.); INCB (n.d.).

3.2 Scheduling in Canada

The treaties bind governments, and each government gives effect to them through its own law. In Canada, that law is the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), assented to on 20 June 1996 (Justice Laws Website, 2026). Its schedules sort substances by the controls and penalties that apply. Schedule I includes the opium poppy and its derivatives, such as morphine and heroin, the fentanyls, cocaine, amphetamine, methamphetamine and ketamine; Schedule II lists synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists; Schedule III includes LSD, psilocybin and methylphenidate; Schedule IV includes barbiturates and benzodiazepines; Schedule VI lists precursors; and Schedule IX covers pill presses. Schedules VII and VIII, which covered cannabis, were repealed in 2018 when the Cannabis Act took effect (Justice Laws Website, 2026). Penalties depend on the schedule: section 4(1) makes possession an offence only for Schedules I, II and III, and possessing a Schedule I substance is punishable by up to seven years in prison on indictment, compared with up to three years for Schedule III.

The schedules can change without a new act of Parliament. Under section 60, the federal Cabinet (the Governor in Council) may add or delete items in Schedules I to IV, VI and IX by order when it considers this "necessary in the public interest." Under section 60.1, the Minister of Health may add a substance to Schedule V for up to one year, renewable for one more year, when there are reasonable grounds to believe it poses a significant risk to public health or safety (Justice Laws Website, 2026). In 2026, Parliament passed the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act (royal assent 26 March 2026), whose Part 2 creates "a new temporary accelerated scheduling pathway" that allows the Minister of Health to add precursor chemicals to Schedule V (S.C. 2026, c. 4). Section 4 returns to precursors and asks what such controls can and cannot achieve.

Interactive 11.1 asks you to match each task in drug control to the body that performs it, at the international and the Canadian level.

Interactive 11.1

Who does what in drug control?

Choose the body that performs each task. One body is used twice.

Together, the international bodies and Canada's schedules form a layered system in which a vote in Vienna can change Canadian criminal law. That system depends on agreement among governments, and the agreement has weakened.

4.1 A Fracturing Consensus

As of March 2008, each of the three conventions had 183 parties, close to every member state of the United Nations (UNODC, 2008). David Bewley-Taylor (2012), in International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured, argues that substantial agreement remains on many aspects of the system, while views on the non-medical use of controlled substances have diverged. He identifies harm reduction and tolerant cannabis policies as central to a process of transformation within the regime. Cases 11.1 and 11.2, and the vote described after them, show what that divergence looks like.

Case 11.1: Bolivia and the coca leaf

The Single Convention required coca-leaf chewing to end within 25 years of its entry into force at the end of 1964 (UNODC, 2008; Blickman, 2013), yet chewing remained a traditional practice in Bolivia. Bolivia withdrew from the Convention with effect from 1 January 2012 and asked to rejoin with a reservation exempting coca-leaf chewing. Sixty-one objections, one third of the 183 parties, would have blocked the reservation; only 15 states objected, among them the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy and Canada. Bolivia rejoined with its reservation on 10 February 2013 (UNODC, 2013; Blickman, 2013).

Case 11.2: Canada's Cannabis Act and the International Narcotics Control Board

On 21 June 2018, after Parliament passed legislation to legalize non-medical cannabis, the INCB stated that legalization "cannot be reconciled with the country's international obligations" (INCB, 2018a). When the Cannabis Act came into force on 17 October 2018, the Board called it "a violation of fundamental provisions of the 1961 Single Convention" (INCB, 2018b). Canada remained a party to all three conventions. Lesson 12 develops the Act and its evaluations.

The third case concerns the treaties themselves. On 2 December 2020, the 53 member states of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs voted 27 in favour, 25 against, with one abstention, to accept a WHO recommendation to remove cannabis from Schedule IV of the Single Convention, the most restrictive category, where it had been listed for 59 years alongside heroin (UN News, 2020). As of October 2026, cannabis remains in Schedule I, so its non-medical use remains outside what the treaty allows. The narrow vote showed a divided Commission: the United States voted in favour, and Chile, among others, voted against (UN News, 2020).

The flip cards below summarize four views of the system. Click each card to read it.

UNODC (2008): achievementsClick to explore
UNODC (2008): unintended consequencesClick to explore
INCB (2018): the treaties as lawClick to explore
Bewley-Taylor (2012): a fractured consensusClick to explore

Try it 11.1 returns to the treaty text.

Try it 11.1: Read the treaty text

Reread Article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention, quoted above, and the box on room for alternatives inside the treaties in 2.1 The Three United Nations Conventions. (a) Identify the phrase in Article 3(2) that limits the obligation to make personal possession a criminal offence. (b) List the measures that the conventions allow in place of conviction or punishment for people who use drugs. (c) Article 4(c) of the Single Convention limits the production and supply of drugs to medical and scientific purposes. Explain why the flexibility you identified in (a) and (b) did not, in the INCB's view, cover Canada's legal market for non-medical cannabis.

Check your reasoning for Try it 11.1v

(a) "Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system." (b) Education, rehabilitation, social reintegration, treatment and aftercare. (c) Both flexibilities concern responses to individuals: people who use drugs and commit drug offences, and, under the 1988 Convention, people who possess drugs for their own use. A legal market licenses production and sale for non-medical purposes, which Article 4(c) of the Single Convention excludes, so the INCB (2018a, 2018b) treated legalization as a breach of the supply obligations.

The international system sets obligations, but governments decide how hard to enforce them. From the 1970s onward, the United States, and later Canada, adopted tougher enforcement and sentencing laws. Section 2 follows that history, which became known as the war on drugs.

Key Takeaways

  • 1.1 International drug control began in Shanghai in February 1909, when 13 countries, with Mackenzie King representing Canada in the British delegation, adopted non-binding resolutions on opium. The Hague International Opium Convention of 1912, which UNODC describes as the first international drug control treaty, added cocaine and heroin to opium and morphine. The League of Nations conventions of 1925 to 1936 then added estimates of medical need, a monitoring board and, from 1931, schedules.
  • 2.1 The 1961 Single Convention limits drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes, sets four schedules and created the INCB. The 1971 Convention extends control to synthetic psychotropic drugs such as amphetamines, hallucinogens and benzodiazepines, and the 1988 Convention targets trafficking, money laundering and precursors and, under Article 3(2), requires a possession offence subject to constitutional principles. All three allow measures such as treatment and rehabilitation as alternatives to conviction or punishment for people who use drugs.
  • 3.1 A substance comes under international control when it is listed in a schedule of the 1961 or 1971 Convention, or, for a precursor, in a table of the 1988 Convention. The WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence reviews the evidence and recommends, the 53 member states of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs vote, the 13-member INCB monitors licit supply and treaty compliance, and UNODC supports the Commission and reports on illicit markets.
  • 3.2 Canada gives effect to the treaties through the schedules of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act of 1996, whose penalties depend on the schedule. Cabinet may amend Schedules I to IV, VI and IX by order when it considers this necessary in the public interest, the Minister of Health may list a substance in Schedule V temporarily, and a 2026 Act created an accelerated pathway for listing precursor chemicals.
  • 4.1 Bolivia's coca reservation of 2013, the INCB's view that Canada's 2018 legal cannabis market breaches the Single Convention, and the 27 to 25 vote of 2020 removing cannabis from Schedule IV illustrate the divergence that Bewley-Taylor (2012) describes. Agreement on much of the system persists and, as of October 2026, the treaties remain in force, but views on the non-medical use of controlled substances, especially cannabis, have split.

Reflection

On 21 June 2018, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) stated that Canada's legalization of non-medical cannabis "cannot be reconciled" with its obligations under the 1961 Single Convention, whose Article 4(c) limits the production, trade, use and possession of drugs "exclusively to medical and scientific purposes." On 2 December 2020, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs voted 27 to 25, with one abstention, to remove cannabis from Schedule IV of the Single Convention while keeping it in Schedule I. In 2012 and 2013, Bolivia left the Single Convention and rejoined with a reservation allowing coca-leaf chewing; 15 of the 183 parties, including Canada, objected, short of the 61 objections needed to block it. In 150 to 250 words, explain whether these three events support David Bewley-Taylor's (2012) claim that the consensus behind the conventions has fractured, and state one argument the INCB would make in reply.

Model answerThe three events support Bewley-Taylor's claim, with qualifications. Each shows a state or group of states departing from a rule that the treaties had treated as settled. Canada's legal market goes furthest, because it breaks the Article 4(c) limit on supply, and the INCB said so publicly in 2018. Bolivia's case shows a different route: it used the treaty's own procedure to carve out coca chewing, and only 15 of 183 parties objected, far short of the 61 needed. The 2020 vote shows division inside the Commission itself, since a change to the most restrictive schedule passed by just two votes. Together they fit Bewley-Taylor's picture of continuing agreement on much of the system alongside divergence over non-medical use, especially of cannabis. The qualifications are that Canada remained a party to the conventions, Bolivia rejoined the 1961 Convention with a reservation after withdrawing, and cannabis stayed in Schedule I, so the regime has bent more than it has broken. The INCB would reply that the treaties are binding law with near-universal membership, reaffirmed by all states, Canada included, at the 2016 General Assembly special session, and that unilateral departures weaken the rules-based international order that protects health. In its view, the response to disagreement is to change the treaties through agreed procedures, as the 2020 vote did.

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Knowledge Check: this section

Question 1: What did the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909 produce?

The delegates in Shanghai acted in an advisory capacity only, so the commission adopted non-binding resolutions, for example on the gradual suppression of opium smoking. The treaty that added cocaine and heroin is tempting, but that was the Hague International Opium Convention of 1912; schedules came with the 1931 Convention, and the INCB was created by the 1961 Single Convention.

Question 2: Which provision of the 1988 Convention concerns people who use drugs most directly?

Article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention requires parties, subject to their constitutional principles, to make possession, purchase or cultivation for personal consumption a criminal offence. Articles 4(c) and 36 are tempting because they are also penal or control provisions, but they belong to the 1961 Single Convention; Article 12 of the 1988 Convention concerns precursors.

Question 3: In the international scheduling process, which body votes on adding a substance to a schedule of the 1961 or 1971 Convention?

The 53 member states of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs vote on scheduling decisions, as they did on cannabis in December 2020. The WHO Expert Committee is the tempting answer because it starts the process, but it reviews evidence and recommends; it does not vote. The INCB monitors compliance and UNODC supports the Commission.

Question 4: Which statement about the Commission on Narcotic Drugs vote of 2 December 2020 is accurate?

The vote, 27 to 25 with one abstention, removed cannabis from Schedule IV, where it had been listed for 59 years, and left it in Schedule I, so non-medical use remains outside what the treaty allows. The option about legal markets is tempting but wrong for that reason, and the narrow margin rules out unanimity.
Section 2 of 5

The War on Drugs in the United States and Canada

⏱ Estimated reading time: 40 minutes
Section 2 of 5

The War on Drugs in the United States and Canada

Scheduling, sentencing and who was punished.

About 40 minutes
The war metaphor

"Public enemy number one"

"America's public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive."Richard Nixon, 17 June 1971
Scheduling

Two ways to build a schedule

United States, 1970

Five schedules defined by abuse potential and accepted medical use.

Canada, 1996

Schedules amended by Cabinet order "in the public interest."

The crack and powder disparity

One drug, two penalties

Quantity ratio (Eq 11.1)
\[ \frac{500\ \text{g powder}}{5\ \text{g crack}} = 100 \qquad \frac{500\ \text{g}}{28\ \text{g}} \approx 17.9 \]
73%of people sentenced federally for crack trafficking in 2025 were Black
Interpretation and Canadian spending

Who enforcement served

The New Jim Crow (2010)

Alexander argues that drug-driven mass incarceration functions as racialized social control; parts of the argument are debated.

70%of Canada's 2007 drug strategy funding went to law enforcement, in one audit (DeBeck et al., 2009)
Canada, 2012 to 2022

Mandatory minimums and their repeal

2012

Safe Streets and Communities Act adds drug minimums.

2007 to 2017 data

39% of Black and 48% of other racialized people admitted carried a minimum offence, versus 31% of White people.

2022

Bill C-5 repeals the six drug minimums and adds diversion.

Carry forward

From sentencing to the whole justice chain

Sentencing is one stage among many.

Next: policing, incarceration, race, human rights and the alternatives inside the justice system.

Content note

This section describes racial disparities in sentencing and imprisonment. If you would like support, the 9-8-8 Suicide Crisis Helpline can be reached by call or text at 9-8-8, and the Hope for Wellness Help Line for Indigenous people is available at 1-855-242-3310.

Introduction

Section 1 described the obligations that governments accepted under the international conventions. The conventions leave each government to decide how hard to enforce them, and in the last three decades of the twentieth century the United States chose an approach its president described as an "all-out offensive." Canada followed some of the same path, more slowly and with its own laws.

The section follows the United States first, because its laws and its politics shaped debates in Canada, and then turns to Canada's mandatory minimum penalties and their repeal in 2022.

Learning Objectives

  • 5.1 Explain what the phrase "war on drugs" refers to and why this course treats it as a historical policy term.
  • 5.2 Compare how the United States Controlled Substances Act and Canada's Controlled Drugs and Substances Act place drugs in schedules.
  • 5.3 Explain the 100-to-1 crack and powder cocaine sentencing disparity, its reduction to 18-to-1 in 2010 and its racial effects, and calculate a quantity ratio.
  • 5.4 Summarize Michelle Alexander's argument in The New Jim Crow (2010).
  • 5.5 Describe Canada's enforcement-oriented drug policies, including the funding of the 2007 National Anti-Drug Strategy and the mandatory minimum penalties of 2012 to 2022.
  • 5.6 Weigh the arguments for and against mandatory minimum penalties and explain what Bill C-5 changed in 2022.

5.1 The War on Drugs in the United States: "Public Enemy Number One"

The American war on drugs combined a new scheduling law, larger enforcement agencies and, from the 1980s, long mandatory prison sentences. This part of the section describes the scheduling law, the sentencing laws and the racial pattern in who was punished.

On 17 June 1971, President Richard Nixon told reporters that "America's public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive." He described it as "a worldwide offensive dealing with the problems of sources of supply" (Nixon, 1971). The term "drug abuse" was common in official language at the time; this course uses "substance use" and "substance use disorder," as Lesson 1 explained. Nixon's words framed drug use as a threat to national security and drug control as a campaign to be won, the framing that the phrase "war on drugs" came to summarize.

Lesson 1 noted that the "war on drugs" is a historical policy term whose military metaphor framed drug use as an enemy to be defeated. This course uses it to name a period of policy, without adopting its framing.

5.2 Scheduling Under the Controlled Substances Act

The legal basis for that campaign was the Controlled Substances Act, enacted in October 1970. It established five schedules, numbered I to V, and set out criteria for each in the statute (21 U.S.C. § 812). A drug in Schedule I must have "a high potential for abuse," "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States" and "a lack of accepted safety for use ... under medical supervision." Schedule II also requires a high potential for abuse but allows a currently accepted medical use, and lower schedules require progressively lower potential for abuse.

Canada's Controlled Drugs and Substances Act works differently. Section 1 showed that Cabinet may amend Schedules I to IV when it considers a change "necessary in the public interest," and the Act sets no statutory test of medical use or abuse potential for those schedules (Justice Laws Website, 2026). In the United States, by contrast, placing a substance in Schedule I amounts to a legal finding that it has no currently accepted medical use in the country.

5.3 Mandatory Minimums and the Crack and Powder Disparity

In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which created five-year and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties for trafficking cocaine, set by the quantity of the drug. A mandatory minimum penalty is a minimum prison term that a judge must impose on conviction, whatever the circumstances of the case. According to the United States Sentencing Commission (2015), these were the first federal mandatory minimums since their "near-complete repeal" in 1970. The Act treated the two forms of cocaine differently: it required 100 times as much powder cocaine as crack cocaine to trigger the same penalty, a 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio. Five grams of crack and 500 grams of powder each triggered the five-year minimum, and 50 grams of crack and 5,000 grams of powder each triggered the ten-year minimum (United States Sentencing Commission, 2015).

The two forms are the same drug. Lesson 3 (Case 3.1) described Hatsukami and Fischman's (1996) review, which found the effects of powder and crack cocaine similar and traced differences in dependence to the route and speed of delivery. The Sentencing Commission itself took the position from 1995 onward that the 100-to-1 ratio undermined the goals of federal sentencing, and in 2002 it recommended a ratio of no more than 20-to-1 (United States Sentencing Commission, 2015).

The Fair Sentencing Act, enacted on 3 August 2010, raised the crack thresholds to 28 grams for the five-year minimum and 280 grams for the ten-year minimum, leaving the powder thresholds unchanged. The result was an 18-to-1 ratio. The Act also eliminated the mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack (United States Sentencing Commission, 2015). Figure 11.3 compares the quantities that triggered the five-year minimum before and after 2010.

Grams that trigger the five-year federal minimum Crack, 1986 Act Crack, 1986 Act: 5 grams 5 g Crack, 2010 Act Crack, Fair Sentencing Act of 2010: 28 grams 28 g Powder, both laws Powder cocaine, both laws: 500 grams 500 g Ratio of powder to crack: 100 to 1 in 1986; about 18 to 1 after 2010.
Figure 11.3. Quantities of crack and powder cocaine that triggered the five-year federal mandatory minimum in the United States under the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act (United States Sentencing Commission, 2015).

The disparity matters because of who was sentenced. Both before and after the 2010 reform, more than three quarters of the people sentenced federally for crack cocaine trafficking were Black (United States Sentencing Commission, 2015). In fiscal year 2025, 73 percent of people sentenced for crack trafficking were Black, compared with 23 percent of people sentenced for powder cocaine trafficking, 70 percent of whom were Hispanic (United States Sentencing Commission, 2026a, 2026b). A rule that treats one form of a drug 100 times more harshly than another therefore falls far more heavily on one racial group.

Quantity ratio
quantity ratio = powder cocaine quantity ÷ crack cocaine quantityEq 11.1
The quantity ratio is the quantity of powder cocaine that triggers a penalty divided by the quantity of crack cocaine that triggers the same penalty.

Equation 11.1 expresses the disparity as a single number. Worked Example 11.1 applies it to the five-year thresholds.

Worked Example 11.1: The crack and powder ratio before and after 2010

Under the 1986 Act, 500 grams of powder and 5 grams of crack triggered the five-year minimum. After the Fair Sentencing Act, the powder threshold stayed at 500 grams and the crack threshold rose to 28 grams.

  • Ratio in 1986: 500 ÷ 5 = 100. One gram of crack was treated like 100 grams of powder.
  • Ratio after 2010: 500 ÷ 28 = 17.9, which the Sentencing Commission describes as 18-to-1.
  • Change in the crack threshold: 28 ÷ 5 = 5.6, so a person now had to be found with 5.6 times as much crack to face the same minimum.

The ratio fell by more than four fifths, from 100 to about 18, yet a gram of crack still counted for about 18 grams of powder.

Use Calculator 11.1 to reproduce the worked example and to compare the five-year and ten-year thresholds under both laws.

5.4 The New Jim Crow

The civil rights lawyer Michelle Alexander gave these patterns a broad interpretation in The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (Alexander, 2010). Jim Crow laws enforced racial segregation in the southern United States after the abolition of slavery. Alexander concluded that mass incarceration, driven largely by the war on drugs, had "emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow" (Alexander, 2010, as quoted in Forman, 2012). Her argument is an interpretation of history as well as a set of empirical claims. The Sentencing Commission data above support one part of it, the concentration of severe crack cocaine penalties on Black Americans. Other parts are debated. The legal scholar James Forman Jr. (2012) argued that the Jim Crow analogy oversimplifies the origins of mass incarceration, overlooks support for punitive crime policy among some Black Americans, and focuses on drug offences although people convicted of drug offences made up only about a quarter of American prisoners. Section 3 examines comparable Canadian evidence.

The American war on drugs thus combined criteria-based scheduling, quantity-based mandatory minimums and a sentencing structure whose burden fell unevenly by race. Canada borrowed some of these tools, in particular mandatory minimums, but on a smaller scale and later.

5.5 Canada's Enforcement Policies

Canada's federal drug policy has also relied heavily on criminal law and policing. This part describes how enforcement dominated federal drug spending and how mandatory minimum penalties came into force in 2012; the next part weighs those penalties and the reforms that replaced them in 2022.

5.5.1 Enforcement and the Federal Drug Strategy

Lesson 2 described how the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act of 1996 replaced earlier legislation and kept the possession of cannabis a criminal offence, and Lesson 12 traces Canada's national drug strategies from 1987 to 2016. A single figure shows the weight of enforcement within them. In October 2007, the federal government launched a National Anti-Drug Strategy with $64 million in new funding, two thirds of it reportedly for prevention and treatment. When DeBeck and colleagues (2009) added the new money to existing base funding, law enforcement still received 70 percent of drug strategy funding, compared with 17 percent for treatment, 4 percent for prevention and 2 percent for harm reduction.

5.5.2 Mandatory Minimum Penalties, 2012 to 2022

In 2012, Parliament passed the Safe Streets and Communities Act (Bill C-10), which received royal assent on 13 March 2012 (Parliament of Canada, 2012). Among many changes to criminal law, it added mandatory minimum penalties for particular drug offences in certain circumstances (Elliott & Coady, 2016). The Controlled Drugs and Substances Act came to contain six mandatory minimums, covering trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking, importing and exporting, and the production of Schedule I or II substances (Department of Justice Canada, 2021a).

Courts soon tested these penalties against the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In R. v. Lloyd (2016), Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, reasoned that mandatory minimums for offences that can be committed in many ways, by many kinds of people, are constitutionally vulnerable because they will almost inevitably catch cases in which the minimum would be unconstitutional (Trinh & Whitehead, 2022). Several of the drug minimums were struck down by Canadian courts before Parliament repealed them, while others were upheld (Trinh & Whitehead, 2022).

The Department of Justice examined who was imprisoned under these laws. Between 2007–2008 and 2016–2017, drug offences made up 75 percent of the offences punishable by a mandatory minimum among people admitted to federal custody, and 89 percent of those drug offences were for trafficking (Department of Justice Canada, 2017). Black people made up about 9 percent of all federal admissions but 11 percent of admissions with a mandatory minimum offence. Thirty-nine percent of Black people admitted, and 48 percent of people from other racialized groups, were admitted for an offence carrying a mandatory minimum, compared with 31 percent of White people; among Indigenous people admitted, the proportion rose from 14 percent in 2007–2008 to 26 percent in 2016–2017 (Department of Justice Canada, 2017).

Try it 11.2 uses the Department of Justice admission figures above to compare groups.

Try it 11.2: Who was admitted under mandatory minimums?

Between 2007–2008 and 2016–2017, Black people made up about 9 percent of all admissions to federal custody and 11 percent of admissions for an offence punishable by a mandatory minimum; people from other racialized groups made up about 9 percent and 13 percent (Department of Justice Canada, 2017). (a) For each group, divide the share of mandatory minimum admissions by the share of all admissions. (b) Explain in two sentences what a result above 1 means. (c) Name one reason, other than the penalty itself, that could produce a ratio above 1.

Check your reasoning for Try it 11.2v

(a) Black people: 11 ÷ 9 = 1.2; other racialized groups: 13 ÷ 9 = 1.4. (b) A ratio above 1 means the group's share of mandatory minimum admissions is larger than its share of all admissions, so mandatory minimums fell more often on people in that group than on people admitted to federal custody as a whole. (c) Differences at earlier stages, such as where police focus enforcement or which charges prosecutors pursue, could produce the same pattern; Section 3 develops these stages.

5.6 Weighing Mandatory Minimums: Bill C-5 and the 2022 Reforms

Mandatory minimums have long been debated. Elliott and Coady (2016), in a review prepared for the Department of Justice, summarized the arguments on each side, which the tabs below present.

Supporters argue that mandatory minimums reduce disparities in sentencing, because everyone convicted of the offence receives the same minimum regardless of cultural, economic or social differences. They also argue that limits on judicial discretion make sentencing consistent, and that such laws express the public will. Public opinion is mixed. In a 2005 poll, 74 percent of respondents said sentencing was too lenient and 58 percent viewed mandatory minimums as a good idea, while other Canadian opinion research found that 57 percent believed mandatory minimums often or sometimes result in an unfair sentence and 75 percent expressed strong support for judicial discretion (Elliott & Coady, 2016).

Critics argue that some mandatory minimums violate the Charter, that harsh penalties are an expensive and ineffective way to deter crime, that a one-size-fits-all minimum conflicts with the principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender, and that such penalties fall disproportionately on racialized and Indigenous people. They also note that Canada, unlike some other jurisdictions, has no "safety valve" allowing judges to depart from a minimum in exceptional cases (Elliott & Coady, 2016).

Elliott and Coady (2016) report that some of the evidence suggests harsh penalties such as mandatory minimums are ineffective at deterring crime, and that falls in crime in jurisdictions with mandatory minimums often began before the laws took effect. The Department of Justice data above show that the drug minimums applied mostly to trafficking and that they were imposed on Black, Indigenous and other racialized people at higher rates than on White people.

The federal government introduced Bill C-5 on 7 December 2021, and it received royal assent on 17 November 2022 (Parliament of Canada, 2022). It repealed all six mandatory minimum penalties in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and those for 14 offences in the Criminal Code (Department of Justice Canada, 2021a), widened the availability of conditional sentences served in the community, and added a new Part I.1 on "evidence-based diversion measures" for simple possession (Justice Laws Website, 2026). The government's backgrounder justified the repeal partly by overrepresentation: in 2020, Indigenous adults made up 5 percent of the Canadian adult population but 30 percent of people in federal custody, and in 2018–2019 Black people made up 7 percent of the federal offender population and 3 percent of the Canadian population (Department of Justice Canada, 2021a).

The new Part begins with a declaration of principles. Section 10.1 states that "problematic substance use should be addressed primarily as a health and social issue" and that "criminal sanctions imposed in respect of the possession of drugs for personal use can increase the stigma associated with drug use and are not consistent with established public health evidence" (Justice Laws Website, 2026). Section 3 examines how the diversion measures work. Figure 11.4 places Bill C-5 among the other Canadian milestones in this lesson.

1996Controlled Drugsand SubstancesAct 2007Anti-Drug Strategy:70% of funding toenforcement 2012Safe Streets Actadds mandatorydrug minimums 2016R. v. Lloyd: broadminimums arevulnerable 2018Cannabis Actin force(Lesson 12) 2022Bill C-5 repealsdrug minimums,adds diversion 2023 to 2026British Columbiaexemption(Lesson 12) 2026Faster schedulingof precursors(Section 4) Red: measures that expanded enforcement. Teal: legal limits and reforms.
Figure 11.4. Milestones in Canadian drug law from 1996 to 2026, compiled from the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, DeBeck et al. (2009), Elliott and Coady (2016), Trinh and Whitehead (2022) and S.C. 2026, c. 4.

Comparing the Two Countries

The United States and Canada share a treaty framework and a border, and their drug laws developed in parallel. Table 11.3 sets the main features side by side, drawing on the sources cited in this section.

Table 11.3. Features of drug enforcement in the United States and Canada compared.

FeatureUnited StatesCanada
Main federal drug lawControlled Substances Act (1970)Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (1996)
How schedules are setStatutory criteria of abuse potential and accepted medical useCabinet order "in the public interest"; temporary Schedule V listings by the Minister of Health
Signature sentencing lawAnti-Drug Abuse Act (1986): quantity-based minimums, 100-to-1 cocaine ratioSafe Streets and Communities Act (2012): six drug minimums
Main reformFair Sentencing Act (2010): ratio reduced to 18-to-1Bill C-5 (2022): drug minimums repealed; diversion for possession
Racial pattern in the data73% of people sentenced for crack trafficking were Black (2025)Black and other racialized people admitted under minimums at higher rates (2007 to 2017)

Both countries moved toward harsher sentencing in the 1980s and 2010s and partly reversed course later. Sentencing law, however, is only one stage of enforcement. Section 3 examines the stages before and after sentencing, from police contact to incarceration, and the alternatives to prosecution that the conventions permit.

Key Takeaways

  • 5.1 On 17 June 1971, Richard Nixon called drug abuse "America's public enemy number one" and announced an "all-out offensive," framing drug use as an enemy and drug control as a campaign to be won. This course uses "war on drugs" as a historical policy term that names a period of policy, without adopting its military framing.
  • 5.2 The United States Controlled Substances Act of 1970 sets five schedules defined in the statute by abuse potential and accepted medical use, so a Schedule I listing is a legal finding that a drug has no accepted medical use. Canada's Controlled Drugs and Substances Act sets no such statutory test for Schedules I to IV, which Cabinet amends by order when it considers a change necessary in the public interest.
  • 5.3 The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act required 100 times as much powder as crack cocaine to trigger the same mandatory minimum, although the two forms are the same drug, and the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the ratio to about 18-to-1. A quantity ratio, the powder quantity divided by the crack quantity, summarizes the disparity in one number. Because more than three quarters of people sentenced federally for crack trafficking were Black, the rule fell far more heavily on one racial group.
  • 5.4 Michelle Alexander (2010) argued that mass incarceration driven by the war on drugs works as a system of racialized social control similar to Jim Crow. Sentencing data support the concentration of severe crack penalties on Black Americans, while critics such as Forman (2012) argue that the analogy oversimplifies the origins of mass incarceration and overlooks that people convicted of drug offences were only about a quarter of American prisoners.
  • 5.5 When base funding is included, law enforcement received about 70 percent of the funding for Canada's 2007 National Anti-Drug Strategy (DeBeck et al., 2009). The Safe Streets and Communities Act of 2012 brought six drug mandatory minimums into the CDSA, several of which courts struck down after R. v. Lloyd (2016), and between 2007 and 2017 offences carrying a minimum were more common among Black and other racialized people admitted to federal custody than among White people.
  • 5.6 Supporters argue that mandatory minimums make sentences consistent and express public concern about crime, while critics point to Charter violations, weak deterrence, disproportionate sentences and a heavier burden on racialized and Indigenous people. Bill C-5 (2022) repealed the six drug minimums, widened conditional sentences and added diversion measures for simple possession, declaring that problematic substance use should be addressed primarily as a health and social issue.

Reflection

Between 2007–2008 and 2016–2017, drug offences made up 75 percent of offences punishable by a mandatory minimum penalty among people admitted to federal custody in Canada. Thirty-nine percent of Black people and 48 percent of people from other racialized groups admitted to federal custody were admitted for an offence carrying a mandatory minimum, compared with 31 percent of White people. Bill C-5 (royal assent 17 November 2022) repealed the six mandatory minimums in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and added a principle that criminal sanctions for personal possession "can increase the stigma associated with drug use and are not consistent with established public health evidence." Supporters of mandatory minimums argue that they make sentences consistent and reflect public concern about crime. In 150 to 250 words, weigh one argument for and one argument against the repeal, and explain what further evidence would show whether the repeal reduced racial disparities in federal custody.

Model answerThe strongest argument for keeping mandatory minimums is consistency: every person convicted of a qualifying trafficking offence receives at least the same sentence, which supporters say limits disparities caused by individual judges. The Justice Canada data undercut that claim. Consistency at the sentencing stage did not produce equal outcomes, because 39 percent of Black people and 48 percent of other racialized people admitted to federal custody carried a minimum-penalty offence, compared with 31 percent of White people. A fixed minimum cannot correct differences that arise earlier, in policing and charging, and it removes the judge's ability to weigh an offender's circumstances, which the proportionality principle requires. The argument against the minimums is therefore stronger on the evidence in the prompt, though the evidence on deterrence is mixed and I would not claim the repeal will reduce drug trafficking. To know whether the repeal reduced disparities, I would want federal admission data by race for trafficking offences before and after November 2022, ideally compared with offences that never carried minimums, to separate the effect of the repeal from wider trends. I would also want data on sentence lengths and on the use of conditional sentences by race, since judges might impose long sentences even without a minimum. Without race-based data at each stage, the effect cannot be measured.

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Knowledge Check: this section

Question 1: Under the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, how much powder cocaine triggered the same five-year federal minimum as 5 grams of crack cocaine?

The 1986 Act required 100 times as much powder as crack, so 500 grams of powder matched 5 grams of crack for the five-year minimum. The figure of 28 grams is tempting because it appears in the reform, but it is the crack threshold set by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010; 50 grams of crack and 5,000 grams of powder were the thresholds for the ten-year minimum.

Question 2: After the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, the five-year minimum was triggered by 500 grams of powder or 28 grams of crack. What is the quantity ratio?

The quantity ratio is 500 divided by 28, which equals 17.9, described by the Sentencing Commission as 18-to-1. The value 5.6 is tempting, but it is the change in the crack threshold (28 divided by 5); 20-to-1 was the Commission's 2002 recommendation, and 100-to-1 was the 1986 ratio.

Question 3: What did DeBeck and colleagues (2009) find about the funding of Canada's 2007 National Anti-Drug Strategy?

When base funding was added to the new money, law enforcement received 70 percent, treatment 17 percent, prevention 4 percent and harm reduction 2 percent. The two-thirds figure is tempting because the government reported it, but it applied only to the $64 million in new funding.

Question 4: What did Bill C-5, which received royal assent on 17 November 2022, do?

Bill C-5 repealed the six mandatory minimums in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, widened conditional sentences and added duties to consider warnings and referrals for simple possession. Removing the possession offence is tempting, but, as of October 2026, possession of Schedule I to III substances remains an offence under federal law; that change would be decriminalization, which Lesson 12 examines.
Section 3 of 5

Policing, Incarceration, Race and Human Rights

⏱ Estimated reading time: 45 minutes
Section 3 of 5

Policing, Incarceration, Race and Human Rights

The whole chain of enforcement and its alternatives.

About 45 minutes
Possession and diversion

New duties since 2022

  • Section 10.2: police consider no action, a warning or a referral.
  • Section 10.3: prosecution only if those options are not appropriate.
  • Failure to consider them does not invalidate a charge.
Race and enforcement

Overrepresentation in federal custody

33.1% vs 5.0%Indigenous people: federal custody (2023–2024) and population (2021)
Representation ratio (Eq 11.2)
\[ \frac{33.1}{5.0} \approx 6.6 \qquad \frac{9.7}{4.3} \approx 2.3 \]

Cannabis arrest data from five cities agree (Owusu-Bempah & Luscombe, 2021).

Human rights

Drug wars and the death penalty

Philippines

6,252 killed in anti-drug operations, 2016 to 2022 (government figure); as of October 2026, ICC trial set for November.

Executions

At least 1,212 for drug offences in 2025, a 97% rise from 2024.

Guidelines (2019)

Drug offences are not "most serious crimes"; abolish the death penalty for them.

Drug treatment courts

Promising, contested evidence

Reviews

Recidivism 38% versus 50% in adult courts (Mitchell et al., 2012); most outcomes at high risk of bias (Trood et al., 2021).

Critique

Equivocal evidence; long sentences after failure; limits on methadone (Csete & Tomasini-Joshi, 2015).

Canada

One evaluation: 36% lower likelihood of new charges after year one (Department of Justice Canada, 2022).

Police diversion

Before any charge

58%lower odds of arrest for LEAD participants over the longer term, in one evaluation (Collins et al., 2017)
  • Seattle, October 2011; non-randomized design, so groups may differ.
  • Review: police diversion generally prevents offending; effects on drug use unclear (Blais et al., 2022).
Carry forward

From people to markets

Alternatives inside the justice system leave the illegal market untouched.

Next: prices, purity, violence, displacement and the iron law.

Content note

This section discusses racism in policing and incarceration, killings in a national drug campaign and the death penalty for drug offences. If you would like support, the 9-8-8 Suicide Crisis Helpline can be reached by call or text at 9-8-8, and the Hope for Wellness Help Line for Indigenous people is available at 1-855-242-3310.

Introduction

Section 2 followed sentencing laws. Sentencing, however, comes late in a long chain of decisions: a police officer decides whether to stop, search or arrest, a prosecutor decides whether to proceed, and a court decides guilt and punishment. This section examines that chain. It begins with how Canadian law now treats possession, turns to evidence on race and enforcement in Canada, widens the view to drug wars and executions in other countries, and ends with two alternatives that the conventions permit: drug treatment courts and police diversion.

Learning Objectives

  • 6.1 Describe how Canadian criminal law responds to people who possess drugs, including the duties to consider warnings and referrals added to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act in 2022.
  • 6.2 Summarize Canadian evidence on racial disparities in cannabis arrests and federal incarceration, and calculate and interpret a representation ratio.
  • 7.1 Describe the human rights concerns raised by the Philippine drug war and by the death penalty for drug offences, using the International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy (2019).
  • 8.1 Explain how drug treatment courts operate in Canada and evaluate the evidence for and against them.
  • 8.2 Evaluate the evidence on police diversion, using Seattle's Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion program as the main example.

6.1 Enforcement Against People Who Use Drugs

Most people who use drugs meet the justice system through the offence of possession. Section 1 showed that, as of October 2026, possessing a substance in Schedules I to III of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act remains an offence under federal law. People with substance use disorders are also more likely than others to come into contact with police: an analysis of the 2012 Canadian Community Health Survey found that the presence of a mental or substance use disorder was associated with higher odds of police contact (Boyce et al., 2015, as cited in Trinh & Whitehead, 2022).

Contact with the justice system carries health risks. Lesson 5 described the sharply increased risk of overdose death in the weeks after release from prison, when tolerance has fallen; HSCI 402 develops harm reduction in custody and care after release. Lesson 10 described criminalization as one of the social determinants of substance use harms.

Bill C-5 changed the first steps of this chain in 2022. Section 10.2 of the Act now requires a peace officer, before laying a charge for simple possession, to consider whether it would be preferable to take no further action, to warn the person or, with the person's consent, to refer them to a program or service in the community. Section 10.3 allows a prosecution for simple possession only if the prosecutor considers that a warning, a referral or alternative measures are not appropriate, and section 10.4 requires police to keep a record of warnings and referrals (Justice Laws Website, 2026). The duty is to consider these options: under section 10.2(2), an officer's failure to consider them does not invalidate a later charge. How often officers and prosecutors divert therefore depends on discretion, and discretion is where the evidence on race becomes important.

6.2 Race and Drug Enforcement in Canada

A 2021 study of cannabis arrests reported that, because researchers lacked access to criminal justice data broken down by race, little was known about how race influences drug law enforcement in Canada (Owusu-Bempah & Luscombe, 2021). The evidence that exists comes from requests to individual police services and from correctional statistics. This part examines both and introduces a measure for comparing them.

6.2.1 Cannabis Arrests in Five Cities

Owusu-Bempah and Luscombe (2021) obtained data on arrests for minor cannabis possession from police services in five cities: Vancouver, Calgary, Regina, Ottawa and Halifax. With one exception, they found that both Black and Indigenous people were overrepresented among those arrested; the exception was Halifax, where only Black people were overrepresented (Owusu-Bempah & Luscombe, 2021; Fataar et al., 2024). They concluded that cannabis legalization lacked measures to redress the racialized harms of past enforcement, because the full extent of those harms remains largely unknown, and called for broader collection and release of race-based justice data (Owusu-Bempah & Luscombe, 2021). A later national online survey of people aged 16 to 65, conducted in 2019 and 2020, found that Black and Indigenous respondents had more than three times the odds of White respondents of reporting a conviction for a cannabis offence. The differences remained after adjusting for cannabis use and socioeconomic factors; after further adjustment for neighbourhood deprivation, only the difference for Black respondents remained (Fataar et al., 2024). Lesson 2 applied the same reasoning to the convictions of Chinese residents under Canada's early drug laws.

6.2.2 Overrepresentation in Federal Custody

Correctional data show the end point of the chain. In the Correctional Investigator's 2023–2024 annual report, Indigenous people made up 33.1 percent and Black people 9.7 percent of all federally incarcerated people, and 46 percent of women held at the five regional women's institutions were Indigenous (Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2024). In the 2021 census, Indigenous people made up 5.0 percent and Black people 4.3 percent of Canada's population (Statistics Canada, 2022a, 2022b). Figure 11.5 compares these shares.

Share of population and share of federal custody (%) Population, 2021 census Federal custody, 2023 to 2024 Indigenouspeople Indigenous people, population: 5.0 percent5.0% Indigenous people, federal custody: 33.1 percent33.1% Blackpeople Black people, population: 4.3 percent4.3% Black people, federal custody: 9.7 percent9.7% Representation ratios: Indigenous 6.6; Black 2.3 (custody share divided by population share).
Figure 11.5. Shares of Canada's population (2021 census) and of the federally incarcerated population (2023–2024) for Indigenous and Black people (Statistics Canada, 2022a, 2022b; Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2024).

Lesson 2 introduced the representation ratio, which compares a group's share of a justice-system population with its share of the general population. When the shares are already known, the calculation is a single division, shown in Equation 11.2.

Representation ratio from shares
representation ratio = group's share of the justice-system population ÷ group's share of the general populationEq 11.2
The representation ratio is the group's share of the justice-system population (for example, people arrested or people in custody) divided by the group's share of the general population. A ratio of 1 means proportional representation.

Worked Example 11.2 applies Equation 11.2 to the federal custody data in Figure 11.5.

Worked Example 11.2: Representation in federal custody

Indigenous people made up 33.1 percent of federally incarcerated people and 5.0 percent of the population; Black people made up 9.7 percent and 4.3 percent.

  • Indigenous people: 33.1 ÷ 5.0 = 6.6.
  • Black people: 9.7 ÷ 4.3 = 2.3.

Indigenous people were present in federal custody at 6.6 times, and Black people at 2.3 times, their share of the population. These ratios cover all offences, and the census share includes children while prisoners are adults; the Department of Justice (2021a) reported a similar pattern using the adult population, with Indigenous adults at 5 percent of adults and 30 percent of people in federal custody in 2020.

Use Calculator 11.2 to reproduce the worked example and to compare it with the earlier federal figures and with the mandatory minimum data from Section 2.

The box below sets out some cautions for reading these ratios.

Reading overrepresentation carefully

A representation ratio describes a gap; it does not identify its causes. Overrepresentation in custody accumulates across many stages, from where police patrol and whom they stop, through charging and bail decisions, to sentencing laws such as the mandatory minimums in Section 2. It also reflects structural conditions, including colonial policies, racism and poverty, that Lesson 10 introduced and HSCI 214 develops. The cannabis arrest data show that the gap appears at the first stage of enforcement (Owusu-Bempah & Luscombe, 2021), and survey data show a gap in cannabis convictions that persists after differences in cannabis use are taken into account (Fataar et al., 2024). This is why the International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy, discussed below, call on states to monitor the impact of drug laws by race and ethnicity.

Canadian evidence therefore shows disparities at both ends of the enforcement chain, in arrests for possession and in federal custody. In some other countries, drug enforcement has taken forms that raise more basic questions about the right to life.

7.1 Global Drug Wars and the Death Penalty

The conventions leave the severity of punishment largely to each government, and governments have used them to justify very different measures. Case 11.3 and the data on executions that follow it show the most extreme end of drug enforcement, and the Guidelines described afterwards set out the human rights standards that apply to it.

Case 11.3: The Philippine drug war

After Rodrigo Duterte became president of the Philippines in 2016, his government launched a national anti-drug campaign. The government reported that police and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency killed 6,252 people during anti-drug operations between 1 July 2016 and 31 May 2022; the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights calculated in 2020 that the death toll was at least 8,663, and the official toll excludes killings by unidentified gunmen whom rights monitors believe acted in cooperation with police (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In March 2025, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Duterte for the crime against humanity of murder, allegedly committed between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019 in the context of the "war on drugs" campaign, and he was surrendered to the Court on 12 March 2025 (International Criminal Court, 2026). On 23 April 2026, the Court's Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed three counts of crimes against humanity, covering murder and attempted murder, and committed him to trial (Human Rights Watch, 2026). The trial was then scheduled to open on 30 November 2026, and on 8 October 2026 the Trial Chamber found him fit to stand trial (Mateo, 2026). As of late October 2026, the trial had not begun, and he had not been convicted of any crime.

7.1.1 The Death Penalty for Drug Offences

Harm Reduction International has tracked executions for drug offences since 2007. Its global overview for 2025, published in March 2026, reported that at least 1,212 people were executed for drug offences in 2025, excluding China, Vietnam and North Korea, where secrecy prevents a count. This was a 97 percent increase from 615 in 2024 and the highest figure the organization has recorded; drug offences accounted for more than 46 percent of all confirmed executions worldwide. Executions for drug offences were confirmed in China, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Singapore. Thirty-six countries retained the death penalty for drug offences at the end of 2025, after Algeria and the Maldives introduced it for certain drug offences that year, and at least 2,450 people were on death row for drug offences in 22 countries. Among those executed in 2025 were 338 people from ethnic minorities, 271 foreign nationals and 23 women (Harm Reduction International, 2026). The percentage increase can be checked: (1,212 − 615) ÷ 615 = 0.97, or 97 percent.

7.1.2 Human Rights Standards for Drug Policy

In 2019, the International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy set out how existing human rights law applies to drug control. They were developed under the leadership of the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy at the University of Essex and the United Nations Development Programme, and are co-sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme, the World Health Organization, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy, 2019). Open the items below to read three of the Guidelines that apply most directly to this section.

Right to lifev

"No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their life based on actual or perceived drug use or involvement in the illicit drug trade." The Guidelines state that drug offences do not meet the internationally recognized threshold of "most serious crimes" for which the death penalty may be imposed where it exists, and call on states to halt executions, commute death sentences and abolish the death penalty for drug offences. They also call on states to prevent unnecessary or disproportionate lethal force and to hold accountable those responsible for such acts.

Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detentionv

States shall ensure that people are not detained solely on the basis of drug use or drug dependence, and that pre-trial detention is never mandatory for drug-related charges. States should prioritize diversion from prosecution for people arrested for minor drug offences, and non-custodial measures at sentencing.

Equality and non-discriminationv

States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, identify and remedy unjust discrimination in drug laws, policies and practices, and should monitor the impact of drug laws on communities, including by race and ethnicity.

Source: International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy (2019).

The Guidelines' call to prioritize diversion and non-custodial measures leads to the alternatives that Canada and other countries have built inside their justice systems.

8.1 Justice-System Alternatives: Drug Treatment Courts

Section 1 (2.1 The Three United Nations Conventions) showed that all three conventions allow alternatives to conviction or punishment for people who use drugs, and that the 1988 Convention extends them to minor cases and to possession for personal use. Alternatives can operate at different points in the chain of decisions, and Figure 11.6 shows where the Canadian and American examples in this section act.

Police contact Prosecution Court and plea Sentence Warning orreferral (s. 10.2);LEAD in Seattle Proceed only ifwarning or referralis unsuitable(s. 10.3) Drug treatmentcourt after aguilty plea Conditionalsentence; no drugminimum (Bill C-5) Outside the criminal lawDecriminalization removes the offence for small amounts (Lesson 12)
Figure 11.6. Points in the justice process at which alternatives to prosecution or imprisonment operate, with the examples discussed in this section (Justice Laws Website, 2026; Department of Justice Canada, 2023; Collins et al., 2017).

A drug treatment court offers court-supervised treatment to some people who would otherwise go to prison for an offence linked to their drug use. A team that often includes a judge, a prosecutor and a defence lawyer monitors a structured treatment program, and repeated drug testing is common (Csete & Tomasini-Joshi, 2015). The first drug court opened in Florida in 1989, and by mid-2013 there were more than 2,800 in the United States; an estimated 93 percent offered treatment only after a person had appeared before a judge, and participants generally had to plead guilty (Csete & Tomasini-Joshi, 2015).

One synthesis of the evidence is a meta-analysis by Mitchell, Wilson, Eggers and MacKenzie (2012), published as a journal article and as a Campbell systematic review. It pooled 154 independent evaluations with comparison groups: 92 of adult drug courts, 34 of juvenile drug courts and 28 of courts for impaired driving. For adult courts, the average effect was equivalent to a drop in recidivism (new offending) from 50 percent among comparable non-participants to about 38 percent among participants, and the effect was still present up to three years later in the studies that followed participants that long. Only three of the adult-court evaluations were randomized experiments; the authors summarized all three as finding reductions in recidivism, although the size and durability of the effects varied, one trial found almost no effect in its first year, and the pooled estimate from the three was not statistically significant. Juvenile courts showed considerably smaller effects, equivalent to a drop from 50 percent to about 43.5 percent, and adult courts that accepted only non-violent offenders showed larger reductions (Mitchell et al., 2012). A later systematic review by Trood, Spivak and Ogloff (2021) reviewed 56 studies of drug courts and other problem-solving courts that use judicial supervision. In the recidivism outcomes it pooled, it found fewer rearrests after these courts than after usual court processing, with smaller effects for drug courts than for mental health courts, but it rated most outcomes at critical risk of bias and found much unexplained variation between studies.

Csete and Tomasini-Joshi (2015), writing for the Open Society Foundations, described the same evidence as "equivocal." They noted that the U.S. Government Accountability Office judged fewer than 20 percent of 260 drug court evaluations, 44 studies, to have used sound methods. They reported that some courts admit people unlikely to need treatment, citing a study of 284 participants in three misdemeanor drug courts in Delaware, in which about a third had consistently drug-negative urine tests from the start and, its authors concluded, might not have had serious drug problems on entry (DeMatteo et al., 2009). Citing a 2013 meta-analysis of 19 United States studies (Sevigny et al., 2013), they argued that participants did not spend less time incarcerated overall, because those who "failed" often received long sentences after a guilty plea. They also criticized sanctions for relapse, which the World Health Organization treats as a normal part of a chronic condition, and some judges' refusal to allow methadone or buprenorphine treatment (Csete & Tomasini-Joshi, 2015). Taken together, the evidence on drug treatment courts is promising but mixed, rests mostly on non-randomized studies, and is still evolving. Table 11.4 sets the main studies side by side, including the Canadian evaluations described in Case 11.4.

Table 11.4. Evidence on drug treatment courts and police diversion, with the main limitation of each source.

SourceDesignMain findingMain limitation
Mitchell et al. (2012)Meta-analysis of 154 evaluationsAdult courts: recidivism about 38% versus 50%Mostly non-randomized comparisons; almost all in the United States
Csete and Tomasini-Joshi (2015)Policy reviewEvidence equivocal; no net reduction in time incarcerated in one meta-analysisNarrative review; draws on studies of uneven quality
Department of Justice Canada (2022)Matched comparison, federally funded courtsMore charges in year one; 36% lower likelihood of new charges after one yearNot randomized; comparison group drawn from four provinces
Somers et al. (2014)Comparison study, Vancouver drug treatment courtGreater reductions for women and Indigenous participantsSingle court
Collins et al. (2017)Non-randomized controlled evaluation, 318 peoplePolice diversion: 58% lower odds of arrest over the longer termNot randomized; one city
Case 11.4: Canada's drug treatment courts

Canada's first drug treatment courts began as pilot projects in Toronto in 1998 and Vancouver in 2001, and the federal Drug Treatment Court Funding Program was established in 2004 (Department of Justice Canada, 2021b). By the program's 2021 evaluation, it funded 13 courts through agreements with eight provinces and two territories, at a transfer budget of $18.7 million over 2016–2017 to 2020–2021. The courts serve adults charged with non-violent offences linked to a substance use disorder. Participants must plead guilty, attend court regularly, submit to random drug testing and follow a treatment plan, generally for 12 to 18 months; those who complete the program may receive a non-custodial sentence (Department of Justice Canada, 2021b, 2023). Of 1,053 participants active between 2015 and 2021, about one third completed the program; 55 percent were White, 27 percent Indigenous and 3 percent Black, and some interest holders suggested that women, Indigenous and racialized people are underrepresented among participants, citing distrust among potential applicants, perceived bias in the justice system and eligibility rules that exclude people facing violent or gang-related charges (Department of Justice Canada, 2021b).

A Statistics Canada recidivism study for the Department of Justice compared people released from federally funded courts between 2015 and 2018 with a matched group of 2,430 justice-involved non-participants. Participants were more likely to receive new charges in the first year, often for breaching court conditions; after the first year, and up to three years, they had a 36 percent lower likelihood of receiving any new charge (Department of Justice Canada, 2022). A study of the Vancouver court found greater reductions in recidivism among women and Indigenous participants, and longer involvement was associated with lower recidivism (Somers et al., 2014).

8.2 Police Diversion

Diversion can also happen before a charge. Seattle's Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program began in October 2011 in the city's Belltown neighbourhood (University of Washington, 2015). Officers who encounter people suspected of low-level drug or sex work offences can refer them to case management and services such as housing, health care and treatment, without booking or prosecution. LEAD uses harm reduction principles: case managers set goals with participants, and progress is not judged by negative urine tests (Csete & Tomasini-Joshi, 2015; University of Washington, 2015).

Collins, Lonczak and Clifasefi (2017) compared 203 LEAD participants with 115 people who went through the usual system. In the six months after entering the evaluation, LEAD participants had 60 percent lower odds of arrest; over the longer term, they had 58 percent lower odds of arrest and 39 percent lower odds of a felony charge. The design was a non-randomized controlled evaluation, so the groups may have differed in ways the analysis could not fully remove. A systematic review of 27 evaluations of police-based diversion by Blais and colleagues (2022) concluded that such measures are generally effective in preventing criminal offending, but found too little evidence to judge their effects on drug use. Canada's equivalent tool is the duty, since 2022, for officers to consider warnings and referrals for simple possession (Justice Laws Website, 2026), which the evaluations described in this section do not cover.

Interactive 11.2 asks you to place real examples at the stage of the justice process where each one acts, using Figure 11.6 as a guide.

Interactive 11.2

Where does each alternative act?

Choose the stage for each example. One stage is used twice.

Drug treatment courts and police diversion change how the justice system treats people who use drugs, but they leave the illegal market untouched. Section 4 turns to that market and asks what enforcement does to prices, potency and violence.

Key Takeaways

  • 6.1 As of October 2026, possessing a substance in Schedules I to III of the CDSA remains an offence under federal law, and people with mental or substance use disorders have higher odds of police contact. Since Bill C-5, sections 10.2 to 10.4 require police to consider no action, a warning or a referral before charging simple possession, and allow prosecution only when those options are not appropriate. Because a failure to consider them does not invalidate a charge, how often people are diverted depends on discretion.
  • 6.2 With one exception, Black and Indigenous people were overrepresented in cannabis possession arrests in five Canadian cities (Owusu-Bempah & Luscombe, 2021), and survey data show gaps in cannabis convictions that persist after accounting for cannabis use. A representation ratio divides a group's share of a justice-system population by its share of the population: 33.1 ÷ 5.0 = 6.6 for Indigenous people and 9.7 ÷ 4.3 = 2.3 for Black people in federal custody in 2023 to 2024. A ratio describes a gap that builds across policing, charging and sentencing; it does not identify the causes, and monitoring it requires race-based data.
  • 7.1 The Philippine government reported 6,252 people killed in anti-drug operations between 2016 and 2022, and in April 2026 the International Criminal Court committed former president Duterte to trial for crimes against humanity. At least 1,212 people were executed for drug offences in 2025, a 97 percent rise from 2024. The International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy (2019) hold that drug offences are not "most serious crimes," call for abolishing the death penalty for them, and call on states to prioritize diversion and to monitor drug laws by race and ethnicity.
  • 8.1 Drug treatment courts offer court-supervised treatment, usually after a guilty plea, with regular court appearances and drug testing. A meta-analysis of 154 evaluations found adult-court recidivism of about 38 percent compared with 50 percent (Mitchell et al., 2012), and a Canadian study found more charges in the first year but a 36 percent lower likelihood of new charges afterward. Critics call the evidence equivocal, citing mostly non-randomized designs, sanctions for relapse, limits on methadone and buprenorphine, and long sentences for people who fail (Csete & Tomasini-Joshi, 2015); about one third of Canadian participants completed the program.
  • 8.2 Police diversion acts before a charge: Seattle's LEAD program refers people suspected of low-level drug or sex work offences to case management and services without booking or prosecution. LEAD participants had 58 percent lower odds of arrest over the longer term than a comparison group (Collins et al., 2017), but the evaluation was non-randomized and came from one city. Canada's equivalent is the 2022 duty to consider warnings and referrals for simple possession, which the evaluations described here do not cover.

Reflection

A hypothetical provincial working group is deciding whether to expand a drug treatment court or to fund police diversion for people charged with or suspected of minor drug-related offences. It has four pieces of evidence: (a) a meta-analysis of 154 evaluations (Mitchell et al., 2012) in which adult drug courts were associated with recidivism of about 38 percent compared with 50 percent among comparable non-participants; (b) Canadian federal evaluations of federally funded drug treatment courts, in which participants were more likely to be charged in their first year, often for breaching court conditions, but had a 36 percent lower likelihood of new charges after one year, and in which about one third of participants completed the program; (c) a critique (Csete & Tomasini-Joshi, 2015) reporting that, in one meta-analysis, drug court participants did not spend less time incarcerated overall, and that some courts barred methadone or buprenorphine; and (d) a non-randomized evaluation of Seattle's Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion program (Collins et al., 2017) in which participants had 58 percent lower odds of arrest over the longer term. In 150 to 250 words, recommend which option the working group should prioritize, or how to combine them, and name the main weakness in the evidence for your recommendation.

Model answerI would recommend prioritizing police diversion for people suspected of minor offences, while keeping a drug treatment court for people already charged with more serious offences linked to a substance use disorder. Diversion acts earlier, before a charge and a guilty plea, so it avoids the main risk Csete and Tomasini-Joshi identify: that people who do not complete court-supervised treatment receive sentences that cancel out the benefits. It also fits the Canadian finding that about two thirds of court participants do not complete the program, and that many are charged in the first year for breaching conditions. The court remains useful for higher-need people facing custody, because both the meta-analysis and the Canadian study found lower recidivism, in the Canadian study after the first year. If the province keeps the court, it should guarantee access to methadone and buprenorphine and track total time in custody, including after non-completion. The main weakness in the evidence for diversion is that the Seattle evaluation was not randomized and came from one city, so LEAD participants may have differed from the comparison group in ways that also affected arrests. The working group should therefore fund diversion with a built-in evaluation that compares similar people, ideally by allocating places at random when demand exceeds capacity, and that reports results by race and gender.

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Knowledge Check: this section

Question 1: Indigenous people made up 33.1 percent of federally incarcerated people in 2023–2024 and 5.0 percent of the 2021 population. What is the representation ratio?

The representation ratio is 33.1 divided by 5.0, which equals 6.6. The value 28.1 is tempting, but it is the percentage-point gap (33.1 minus 5.0); 2.3 is the ratio for Black people, and 0.15 results from dividing the shares the wrong way round.

Question 2: What did Owusu-Bempah and Luscombe (2021) find in cannabis arrest data from five Canadian cities?

With one exception, Halifax, where only Black people were overrepresented, both Black and Indigenous people were overrepresented among people arrested for cannabis possession. Proportional arrests is the tempting answer, but the study found overrepresentation, and later Canadian survey research found that gaps in cannabis convictions persisted after cannabis use was taken into account; the authors also reported that a lack of race-based justice data left little known about race and drug enforcement in Canada.

Question 3: Which criticism of drug treatment courts did Csete and Tomasini-Joshi (2015) make?

Citing a meta-analysis of 19 studies, they argued that participants did not spend less time incarcerated overall, because people who failed court-supervised treatment often received long sentences after pleading guilty. The convention option is tempting, but all three conventions allow alternatives to conviction or punishment, and most of the drug court evaluations reviewed by Mitchell and colleagues (2012) were non-randomized.

Question 4: In the Canadian recidivism study of federally funded drug treatment courts, which pattern did participants show compared with matched non-participants?

Participants were more likely to be charged in the first year, often for administration of justice offences such as breaching conditions, but had a 36 percent lower likelihood of any new charge after one year. The reverse pattern is tempting, and the study did use a matched comparison group of 2,430 non-participants.
Section 4 of 5

Drug Markets and the Iron Law of Prohibition

⏱ Estimated reading time: 40 minutes
Section 4 of 5

Drug Markets and the Iron Law of Prohibition

What enforcement does to prices, purity and potency.

About 40 minutes
The logic

What supply reduction predicts

Price per pure gram (Eq 11.3)
\[ \text{price per pure gram} = \frac{\text{street price}}{\text{purity}} = \frac{100}{0.30} \approx 333 \]

Prediction: prices rise and purity falls.

The evidence

Cheaper and purer, 1990 to 2007

Heroin

Price −81%; purity +60%

Cocaine

Price −80%; purity +11%

Cannabis

Price −86%; potency +161%

Source: one audit of United States surveillance data (Werb et al., 2013). A review found little evidence that tougher enforcement raises prices (Pollack & Reuter, 2014).

Unintended consequences

Violence and displacement

14 of 15studies in one systematic review linked more enforcement to more market violence (Werb et al., 2011)

The balloon effect

Squeeze supply in one place and it swells in another (UNODC, 2008).

A later review found a similar pattern in a limited evidence base (Wadsworth et al., 2025).

The iron law

More enforcement, more potent drugs?

The more intense the law enforcement, the more potent the drugs become.

Richard Cowan named the iron law in 1986, and Beletsky and Davis applied it to fentanyl (Beletsky & Davis, 2017).

It fits the shifts from beer to spirits and from prescription opioids to fentanyl, but it is hard to test directly.

Explore and apply

Test the iron law, then apply it

Interactive 11.3

An illustrative market: enforcement pressure, potency and price.

Applying this lesson

Canada's 2026 accelerated scheduling of precursor chemicals.

Next steps

Reflect, check and integrate

  • Complete the Section 4 reflection and knowledge check below.
  • Then take the final assessment (Section 5).
  • Lesson 12: alternatives to prohibition.

Content note

This section discusses violence in drug markets and deaths from the unregulated drug supply. If you would like support, the 9-8-8 Suicide Crisis Helpline can be reached by call or text at 9-8-8, the National Overdose Response Service (1-888-688-6677) offers support to people who use drugs alone, and the Hope for Wellness Help Line for Indigenous people is available at 1-855-242-3310.

Introduction

Sections 1 to 3 focused on laws and on the people they reach. Prohibition also creates something else: an illegal market, with producers, traffickers and sellers who respond to enforcement as any business responds to costs and risks. This section asks what enforcement does to that market. It sets out the reasoning behind supply reduction, compares it with long-run data on prices and purity, and then examines three consequences that researchers and UN agencies have described: violence, displacement and a shift toward more potent drugs, which is known as the iron law of prohibition. Some of these consequences are better supported than others.

Learning Objectives

  • 9.1 Explain how supply-side enforcement is expected to affect drug prices, purity and use.
  • 9.2 Calculate a percent change in price and a purity-adjusted price.
  • 9.3 Compare the expectations of supply reduction with price and purity data from 1990 to 2010.
  • 9.4 Summarize systematic review evidence on drug law enforcement and drug market violence.
  • 9.5 Describe the unintended consequences of drug control identified by UNODC, including geographic and substance displacement.
  • 9.6 Explain the iron law of prohibition and apply it to alcohol prohibition and to the shift toward fentanyl in Canada's unregulated drug supply.
  • 9.7 Use an illustrative market model to explore how enforcement pressure can shift a market toward more compact, potent products.

9.1 How Supply Reduction Is Meant to Work

Supply reduction refers to policies that aim to reduce the availability of drugs through crop eradication, seizures, arrests of traffickers and border controls. The reasoning is economic. Enforcement raises the costs and risks of producing and moving drugs; sellers pass those costs on as higher retail prices; and higher prices should discourage use and make it harder for new users to start. Werb and colleagues (2013) described this as the logic of "enforcement-based supply reduction interventions aimed at disrupting global drug supply."

Prohibition already makes prices high. UNODC (2008) noted that "hundred-fold increases in price from production to retail are not uncommon" in illegal drug markets, which is why there is "no shortage of criminals" willing to compete in them. If supply reduction works, two indicators should move in predictable directions: the price of drugs should rise, and their purity should fall, because sellers dilute a scarce product. Researchers therefore track both.

9.2 Price, Purity and the Purity-Adjusted Price

A street price per gram can mislead, because a gram of one sample may contain much more of the drug than a gram of another. The purity-adjusted price solves this by expressing the price per gram of pure drug. Equation 11.3 defines it, together with the percent change used to compare two years.

Purity-adjusted price and percent change
price per pure gram = street price per gram ÷ purity
percent change = (later value − earlier value) ÷ earlier value × 100Eq 11.3
The price per pure gram is the street price per gram divided by the purity, written as a proportion (for example, 30 percent is 0.30). The percent change is the difference between the later and earlier values, divided by the earlier value and multiplied by 100.

Equation 11.3 lets you compare markets in which purity differs. Worked Example 11.3 applies both parts, first to real European price data and then to a hypothetical change in purity.

Worked Example 11.3: Falling prices and rising purity

Werb and colleagues (2013) report that the average retail street price of cocaine in Europe, adjusted for inflation, fell from US$198 per gram in 1990 to US$98 per gram in 2009.

  • Percent change: (98 − 198) ÷ 198 × 100 = −50.5 percent, which the authors report as a 51 percent decrease.
  • For opiates, the price fell from US$295 to US$77 per gram: (77 − 295) ÷ 295 × 100 = −73.9 percent, reported as 74 percent.

Now take a hypothetical market in which the street price stays at $100 per gram while purity rises from 30 percent to 60 percent.

  • Earlier price per pure gram: 100 ÷ 0.30 = $333.
  • Later price per pure gram: 100 ÷ 0.60 = $167.
  • Percent change: (167 − 333) ÷ 333 × 100 = −50 percent.

The street price did not change, yet the price of the drug itself halved, which is why researchers adjust for purity.

Use Calculator 11.3 to reproduce the worked example and to explore how changes in street price and purity combine.

With these tools, the question becomes empirical: did prices rise and purity fall as enforcement grew?

9.3 Prices and Purity Under Enforcement

Werb and colleagues (2013), a team at the BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS in Vancouver, searched for government surveillance systems with at least ten years of data on the price, purity or seizures of illegal drugs and identified seven that met their criteria. Their findings run against the expectation set out above.

In the United States, between 1990 and 2007, the average inflation-adjusted and purity-adjusted prices of heroin, cocaine and cannabis fell by 81 percent, 80 percent and 86 percent, while average purity rose by 60 percent for heroin and 11 percent for cocaine, and the potency of cannabis rose by 161 percent. In Europe, between 1990 and 2009, inflation-adjusted prices of opiates and cocaine fell by 74 and 51 percent. In Australia, between 2000 and 2010, the inflation-adjusted prices of heroin and cannabis each fell by 49 percent and that of cocaine by 14 percent. Over the same periods, seizures in major producing regions and domestic markets generally increased (Werb et al., 2013). Figure 11.7 shows the United States results.

United States, 1990 to 2007: percent change Purity-adjusted price Purity or potency Heroin Heroin price: down 81 percent−81% Heroin purity: up 60 percent+60% Cocaine Cocaine price: down 80 percent−80% Cocaine purity: up 11 percent+11% Cannabis Cannabis price: down 86 percent−86% Cannabis potency: up 161 percent+161% Bars to the left show decreases; bars to the right show increases.
Figure 11.7. Changes in the inflation-adjusted and purity-adjusted retail price and in the purity or potency of heroin, cocaine and cannabis in the United States, 1990 to 2007, from Drug Enforcement Administration surveillance data analyzed by Werb et al. (2013).

The authors concluded that, "with few exceptions and despite increasing investments in enforcement-based supply reduction efforts," prices had generally fallen and purity generally risen since 1990, and that "expanding efforts at controlling the global illegal drug market through law enforcement are failing" (Werb et al., 2013). Their data describe trends; they do not isolate the effect of enforcement from other changes over the same decades, such as shifts in production and trade routes. They do show that the outcome supply reduction predicts, rising prices and falling purity, did not occur in these markets. A review by Pollack and Reuter (2014) reached a related conclusion by a different route: prohibition itself keeps prices far above those likely in legal markets, but the authors found little evidence that raising the risk of arrest, incarceration or seizure raises prices further, and noted that the available studies were few and all faced substantial conceptual and empirical problems.

9.4 Enforcement and Market Violence

Illegal markets cannot use courts or contracts to settle disputes, and UNODC (2008) listed "the creation of a lucrative and violent black market" as the first unintended consequence of drug control. A further question is whether more enforcement makes this violence better or worse.

Werb and colleagues (2011) conducted a systematic review of studies that evaluated the impact of drug law enforcement on drug market violence. They identified 15 studies, 11 of them longitudinal analyses. Fourteen of the 15 (93 percent) reported an adverse impact of enforcement on levels of violence, and 10 of the 11 longitudinal studies found a significant association between drug law enforcement and drug market violence. The authors concluded that increasing enforcement is unlikely to reduce drug market violence and that "disrupting drug markets can paradoxically increase violence," citing the severe drug market violence then occurring in Mexico (Werb et al., 2011). The review rests on a small number of observational studies, mostly from the United States, so it shows a consistent association more than a measured effect size. A later systematic review by Wadsworth and colleagues (2025) for the UK Home Office, which noted that 87 percent of the studies in the 2011 review were from the United States, covered 33 studies published from 2011 onward, most of them from Mexico, the United States and South America. It concluded that drug-related law enforcement is of limited effectiveness in reducing violence and that more of the studies linked it to increased than to decreased violence, while describing the evidence base as limited. Research in this area is still evolving. Case 11.3 in Section 3 described the most extreme form of violent enforcement.

9.5 Displacement and Other Unintended Consequences

Enforcement can also move a market without shrinking it. In its centenary review, UNODC (2008), the agency that supports the drug conventions, set out five unintended consequences of the control system. Table 11.5 summarizes them.

Table 11.5. The five unintended consequences of international drug control described by UNODC (2008), with UNODC's own examples.

ConsequenceWhat UNODC describesExample given
Criminal black marketA large, lucrative and violent illegal industryHundred-fold markups from production to retail
Policy displacementEnforcement absorbs finite resources, and public health may take "the back seat"Law enforcement expands to match the black market
Geographic displacementThe "balloon effect": squeezing supply in one place swells it in anotherOpium production moved from Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to Afghanistan; cocaine production moved from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the late 1990s
Substance displacementSuppliers and users move to a drug with similar effects and weaker controlsAmphetamines, which can be made close to users, are harder to control than cocaine; the same dynamic applies to precursor chemicals
MarginalizationUsing the criminal justice system against people who use drugs, who often come from marginal groups, increases their marginalizationReduced capacity to offer treatment to those who need it most

Synthetic drugs make displacement harder to prevent. UNODC (2008) observed that for amphetamine-type stimulants "there is no botanical raw material to target, and no geographical distance between areas of production and of consumption," that precursor control is the only effective way of controlling their supply, and that "the threat of displacement continues to offset the gains." Canada's 2026 amendment to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, described in Section 1, responds to this problem: it allows the Minister of Health to list new precursor chemicals in Schedule V more quickly (S.C. 2026, c. 4). UNODC (2008) noted that substance displacement "also happens with precursor chemicals." Whether faster listing reduces supply, or prompts producers to switch to other chemicals, is a question that evaluations of the 2026 pathway will need to answer.

9.6 The Iron Law of Prohibition

The last consequence concerns the drugs themselves. Lesson 2 described the alcohol prohibitions of the early twentieth century, and Lesson 5 described how fentanyl and its analogues came to dominate Canada's unregulated opioid supply. The iron law of prohibition links the two.

9.6.1 The Idea

The writer Richard Cowan named the idea the iron law of prohibition in a 1986 essay in National Review, "How the narcs created crack" (Beletsky & Davis, 2017). The law is usually stated this way: the more intense the law enforcement, the more potent the drugs become. The reasoning is logistical. Enforcement targets shipments, and the risk of seizure grows with the bulk of what is moved, so suppliers gain by moving products that deliver more effect per unit of weight or volume. Beletsky and Davis (2017), citing historical studies, describe national alcohol prohibition in the United States in the 1920s as a rapid transition from less potent drinks to distilled spirits such as gin and moonshine: spirits rose from around 40 percent of spending on alcohol before Prohibition to almost 90 percent soon after it began.

Beletsky and Davis (2017) applied the same reasoning to the opioid crisis in the United States, which, they wrote, "morphed from being driven by prescription drugs to one fuelled by heroin and, increasingly, fentanyl." Under the iron law, they argued, efforts to interrupt and suppress the illicit supply "produce economic and logistical pressures favouring ever-more compact substitutes," and this progression toward more potent drugs can be curtailed only through harm reduction and demand reduction policies that acknowledge the structural determinants of health. Figure 11.8 shows the chain of reasoning and the two historical cases.

1. More intenseenforcementseizures, arrests 2. Higher riskper unit of bulkmoved or stored 3. Suppliers favourcompact productsmore effect per gram 4. Potency pergram risesin the supply Alcohol prohibition, United States, 1920s to early 1930sLess potent drinks gave way to distilled spirits (Beletsky & Davis, 2017) Opioids, United States and Canada, 2000s to 2020sPrescription opioids, then heroin, then fentanyl (Beletsky & Davis, 2017; Lesson 5)
Figure 11.8. The reasoning of the iron law of prohibition and two historical cases to which it has been applied (Beletsky & Davis, 2017).

9.6.2 The Canadian Supply

Canada's unregulated supply resembles the end state that the iron law describes. Lesson 5 calculated that fentanyl is about 25 to 50 times as potent as heroin by mass and described the supply-side explanations for the shift to fentanyl. In British Columbia, where the provincial health officer declared a public health emergency on 14 April 2016 (BC Ministry of Health, 2016), the BC Coroners Service reported 1,826 deaths from unregulated drug toxicity in 2025 (preliminary data), about 21 percent fewer than the 2,315 recorded in 2024. Among people who died and received expedited toxicology testing in 2025, fentanyl was detected in 69 percent and fluorofentanyl, a fentanyl analogue, in 54 percent, and smoking was the most common mode of use (BC Coroners Service, 2026). HSCI 402 develops overdose mortality and the responses to it. The box below weighs how strong the evidence for the iron law is.

How strong is the evidence for the iron law?

The iron law is an explanation built from historical cases. It fits the shift from beer to spirits under alcohol prohibition and the shift to fentanyl, and it is consistent with the rising purity that Werb and colleagues (2013) found. It is difficult to test directly, however, because enforcement, production methods and demand change at the same time, and the sources in this section describe associations more than measured effects. Lesson 5 described other drivers of the fentanyl era, including the earlier waves of prescription opioid and heroin use. Treat the iron law as a hypothesis about the direction in which enforcement pushes markets, supported mainly by historical evidence, with the size of its effect in any one case uncertain.

9.7 An Illustrative Drug Market

Interactive 11.3 lets you test the reasoning of the iron law in a simple market. The numbers are hypothetical: two products deliver the same effect, but one is bulky and cheap to make, while the other is compact and more expensive to make. Raise the enforcement pressure on shipments and watch how the market responds.

Interactive 11.3

An illustrative drug market

All values are hypothetical model units. Product A is bulky; Product B delivers the same effect from fewer grams.

Market share of compact Product B
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Potency per gram of the street supply (Product A = 1)
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Price per unit of effect (no enforcement = 100)
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Price if Product B did not exist
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In the model, enforcement raises the cost of moving every gram, which hurts the bulky product far more than the compact one. As pressure rises, Product B takes over the market, the potency of the street supply rises, and the price per unit of effect rises much less than it would if no compact substitute existed. The model is a teaching device with invented costs; its point is the direction of change that the iron law predicts, which matches the historical cases in Figure 11.8.

Applying This Lesson

Applying this lesson: Canada's faster scheduling of precursor chemicals

On 26 March 2026, the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act received royal assent. Part 2 created a temporary accelerated pathway that allows the Minister of Health to add precursor chemicals to Schedule V of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (S.C. 2026, c. 4). In 2025, fentanyl was detected in 69 percent, and the analogue fluorofentanyl in 54 percent, of people in British Columbia who died of unregulated drug toxicity and received expedited testing (BC Coroners Service, 2026). Using this lesson, answer four questions. (1) Which article of which UN convention obliges Canada to control precursors (Section 1)? (2) Using Table 11.5 and the iron law, predict two ways in which producers might respond to faster listing. (3) Propose two indicators that would show whether the measure is working, and name a Canadian source that could supply each. (4) Identify one equity or human rights question from Section 3 that an evaluation of this enforcement measure should also examine.

You have now followed drug control from the Shanghai Opium Commission to the streets of Canadian cities: the treaties and the bodies that schedule drugs, the war on drugs and its sentencing laws, the uneven burden of enforcement and the alternatives built inside the justice system, and the market effects of enforcement itself. Complete the reflection and the knowledge check below, and then the final assessment, which draws the four sections together. Lesson 12 turns to the alternatives to prohibition: decriminalization and legal regulation.

Key Takeaways

  • 9.1 Supply reduction uses crop eradication, seizures, arrests of traffickers and border controls to raise the costs and risks of supplying drugs. If it works, retail prices should rise and purity should fall as sellers dilute a scarcer product, which should discourage use and make it harder for new users to start.
  • 9.2 The price per pure gram is the street price divided by purity written as a proportion, and a percent change is the later value minus the earlier value, divided by the earlier value and multiplied by 100. A street price that stays at $100 per gram while purity rises from 30 to 60 percent halves the price per pure gram, from about $333 to about $167.
  • 9.3 Werb and colleagues (2013) found the opposite of the prediction: in the United States from 1990 to 2007, purity-adjusted prices of heroin, cocaine and cannabis fell by 81, 80 and 86 percent while purity or potency rose, even as seizures generally increased, and prices also fell in Europe and Australia. The data describe trends and do not isolate the effect of enforcement, but the outcome that supply reduction predicts did not occur.
  • 9.4 A systematic review of 15 studies found that 14 reported an adverse impact of enforcement on violence, and 10 of 11 longitudinal studies found a significant association between drug law enforcement and drug market violence (Werb et al., 2011). Disrupting drug markets can paradoxically increase violence, although the evidence is observational and comes mostly from the United States.
  • 9.5 UNODC (2008) named five unintended consequences of drug control: a criminal black market, policy displacement, geographic displacement (the balloon effect), substance displacement and the marginalization of people who use drugs. Synthetic drugs and their precursors make displacement especially hard to prevent, and whether Canada's 2026 faster listing of precursors reduces supply remains to be shown by evaluation.
  • 9.6 The iron law of prohibition, named by Richard Cowan in 1986, holds that the more intense the enforcement, the more potent the drugs become, because suppliers favour products that deliver more effect per unit of bulk. It fits the shift to distilled spirits under alcohol prohibition and the shift from prescription opioids to heroin to fentanyl, which was detected in 69 percent of tested unregulated drug deaths in British Columbia in 2025. It is best treated as a hypothesis about direction, supported mainly by historical evidence, since enforcement, production and demand change together.
  • 9.7 In the illustrative market model, enforcement raises the cost of moving every gram, so the compact, potent product takes over the market as pressure rises. Potency per gram of the supply rises, and the price per unit of effect rises much less than it would without a compact substitute, the direction of change that the iron law predicts; the model's numbers are hypothetical.

Reflection

Werb and colleagues (2013) found that between 1990 and 2007 in the United States, the inflation-adjusted and purity-adjusted prices of heroin, cocaine and cannabis fell by 81, 80 and 86 percent while purity or potency rose, even as enforcement increased. In 2025, fentanyl was detected in 69 percent, and the analogue fluorofentanyl in 54 percent, of people in British Columbia who died of unregulated drug toxicity and received expedited toxicology testing. The iron law of prohibition, named by Richard Cowan in 1986, holds that the more intense the law enforcement, the more potent the drugs become. In 150 to 250 words, explain how the iron law would account for the shift toward fentanyl, identify one reason why this explanation is hard to test, and describe one piece of evidence that would strengthen or weaken it.

Model answerThe iron law explains the shift toward fentanyl through the logistics of an illegal market. Enforcement targets shipments, so every kilogram moved carries a risk of seizure and arrest. A supplier who switches from heroin to fentanyl, which Lesson 5 showed is about 25 to 50 times as potent by mass, can deliver the same effect in a far smaller package, cutting the risk per unit sold. Beletsky and Davis (2017) described the American opioid supply moving in this direction, and the British Columbia toxicology figures from 2018 to 2023 show a supply dominated by fentanyl and its analogues. Werb's finding that purity rose while prices fell is consistent with this account. The explanation is hard to test because enforcement, production technology and demand all changed at the same time. Cheaper chemical synthesis, for example, could have made fentanyl attractive even without more enforcement, and there is no comparison market with no enforcement. Evidence that would strengthen the iron law would be a study showing that potency rose faster in places or periods where interdiction intensified, after accounting for production costs. Evidence that would weaken it would be a finding that fentanyl spread just as quickly in markets where enforcement against shipments was stable or declining. Either result would need careful attention to differences between markets.

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Knowledge Check: this section

Question 1: If supply reduction worked as intended, which change in drug market indicators would researchers expect to see?

Supply reduction aims to raise costs and risks, so prices should rise and purity should fall as sellers dilute a scarcer product. Falling prices with rising purity is the tempting answer because it is what Werb and colleagues (2013) actually found, which is why their study challenged the approach.

Question 2: A street price stays at $100 per gram while purity rises from 30 percent to 60 percent. What happens to the price per pure gram?

The price per pure gram is 100 divided by 0.30, about $333, before and 100 divided by 0.60, about $167, after, a fall of 50 percent. The unchanged option is tempting because the street price stayed the same; the buyer now receives twice as much drug per gram, so each pure gram costs half as much.

Question 3: What does UNODC call the balloon effect?

UNODC (2008) used the balloon effect for geographic displacement: squeezing production in one place makes it swell in another, as when opium production moved from Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to Afghanistan. Switching drugs is tempting, but UNODC calls that substance displacement; rising potency is the iron law, and spending shifts are policy displacement.

Question 4: Which statement best expresses the iron law of prohibition?

Richard Cowan's iron law, as it is usually stated, holds that the more intense the law enforcement, the more potent the drugs become, because suppliers favour products that deliver more effect per unit of bulk. The option about lower potency is tempting because it sounds like the goal of enforcement, but the historical cases on which this hypothesis mainly rests, from spirits under alcohol prohibition to fentanyl, point the other way.
Section 5 of 5

Final Assessment

⏱ Estimated time: 30 minutes

Bringing It All Together

This lesson followed drug control from its origins to its effects. Section 1 showed how a non-binding commission in Shanghai in 1909, with Mackenzie King representing Canada, led to the Hague Convention of 1912 and then to the three UN conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988. Those treaties limit drugs to medical and scientific purposes, require criminal offences for trafficking and, subject to constitutional principles, for possession, and allow alternatives to punishment for people who use drugs. The WHO Expert Committee recommends, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs votes, the INCB monitors, and Canada gives effect to the system through the schedules of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. Bolivia's coca reservation, Canada's legal cannabis market and the narrow 2020 vote show a consensus that has fractured without breaking.

Sections 2 and 3 followed enforcement through sentencing, policing and incarceration. The United States built a war on drugs on criteria-based scheduling and quantity-based minimums, including the 100-to-1 crack and powder ratio, whose burden fell overwhelmingly on Black Americans. Canada spent most of its drug strategy money on enforcement, imposed drug minimums from 2012 and repealed them in 2022, when Bill C-5 also added duties to consider diversion for possession. Canadian data show Black and Indigenous people overrepresented in cannabis arrests and federal custody, and elsewhere drug enforcement has included mass killings and executions that human rights standards reject. Drug treatment courts and police diversion offer alternatives with promising evidence, mostly from non-randomized studies, and real limitations.

Section 4 turned to the market. Supply reduction predicts rising prices and falling purity, yet in United States surveillance data from 1990 to 2007 prices fell and purity rose, systematic reviews in 2011 and 2025 found enforcement linked more often to increased than to decreased market violence, and suppression in one place displaced production elsewhere. The iron law of prohibition, a hypothesis supported mainly by historical evidence, offers one explanation for why the supply moved toward more potent drugs, ending in the fentanyl-dominated supply of the 2020s. Together, these findings give you the evidence to weigh claims about enforcement before Lesson 12 examines the alternatives.

Key Takeaways from this lesson

  1. International drug control began with the non-binding Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909, at which Mackenzie King represented Canada, and the Hague International Opium Convention of 1912, which UNODC describes as the first international drug control treaty.
  2. The 1961 Single Convention limits drugs to medical and scientific purposes, the 1971 Convention extends control to synthetic psychotropic drugs, and the 1988 Convention targets trafficking and precursors and requires a possession offence subject to constitutional principles.
  3. The WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence recommends, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs votes on scheduling, the INCB monitors compliance, and Canada gives effect to the system through the CDSA schedules, which Cabinet and the Minister of Health can amend.
  4. Bolivia's coca reservation, Canada's 2018 cannabis market and the 27 to 25 vote of 2020 support Bewley-Taylor's view that the consensus behind the conventions has fractured, while the treaties remained in force as of October 2026.
  5. The United States 100-to-1 crack and powder ratio, reduced to 18-to-1 in 2010, concentrated severe drug sentences on Black Americans, and a quantity ratio summarizes such a disparity in one number. Canada spent about 70 percent of its 2007 drug strategy funding on enforcement, imposed drug mandatory minimums from 2012 that fell more often on Black and other racialized people, and repealed them through Bill C-5 in 2022.
  6. Since 2022, police and prosecutors must consider warnings and referrals before charging simple possession, although diversion still depends on discretion. Representation ratios show Black and Indigenous people overrepresented in Canadian cannabis arrests and federal custody, gaps that build across policing, charging and sentencing and that require race-based data to monitor.
  7. Violent drug campaigns and at least 1,212 executions for drug offences in 2025 conflict with the International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy, which call for abolishing the death penalty for drug offences.
  8. Drug treatment courts and police diversion are associated with lower recidivism in reviews of mostly non-randomized evaluations, but critics note low completion, coercion and the risk of longer custody for people who fail.
  9. In surveillance data from 1990 to about 2010, prices fell and purity rose despite growing enforcement, the reverse of what supply reduction predicts; systematic reviews link enforcement more often to increased than to decreased market violence; UNODC describes displacement; and the iron law of prohibition, a hypothesis supported mainly by historical evidence, holds that enforcement pushes markets toward more potent drugs such as fentanyl.

Core Concepts Reviewed

Section 1: the Shanghai Opium Commission, the Hague Convention, the 1961, 1971 and 1988 conventions, schedules, the WHO Expert Committee, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the INCB, UNODC, CDSA scheduling and a fracturing consensus.

Section 2: the war on drugs as a historical policy term, the Controlled Substances Act, mandatory minimum penalties, the crack and powder quantity ratio, The New Jim Crow, enforcement-dominated funding and Bill C-5.

Section 3: diversion duties for simple possession, race-based enforcement data, representation ratios, the Philippine drug war, the death penalty for drug offences, the International Guidelines, drug treatment courts and police diversion.

Section 4: supply reduction, purity-adjusted price and percent change, falling prices and rising purity, market violence, geographic, substance and policy displacement, precursor control and the iron law of prohibition.

The final reflection asks you to analyze one Canadian drug policy from the international, equity and market perspectives developed in this lesson.

Reflection

Choose one Canadian drug policy discussed in this lesson: the mandatory minimum penalties for drug offences (2012 to 2022), the diversion measures for simple possession added by Bill C-5 in 2022, the federally funded drug treatment courts, or the accelerated scheduling of precursor chemicals created in March 2026. In 200 to 300 words, analyze the policy from three angles used in this lesson: (1) how it relates to Canada's obligations or flexibilities under the UN drug conventions; (2) what the evidence on race and enforcement suggests about whom it is likely to affect; and (3) what the evidence on drug markets (prices, purity, displacement or the iron law) suggests about its effects on the drug supply. End with one question that an evaluation of the policy should answer.

Model answerI chose the diversion measures that Bill C-5 added to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act in 2022: police must consider a warning, no action or a referral before charging a person with simple possession, and prosecutors may proceed only when those options are not appropriate. Under Article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention, Canada must still treat possession as an offence, subject to its constitutional principles, but all three treaties allow alternatives to conviction or punishment for people who use drugs. Diversion uses that flexibility without removing the offence, so it stays within the treaties in a way that Canada's cannabis market did not. On race, the measures could matter most for Black and Indigenous people, who were overrepresented in cannabis arrests in five cities and were overrepresented in federal custody in 2023 to 2024 at ratios of about 2.3 and 6.6. The duty is only to consider diversion, however, and failing to consider it does not invalidate a charge, so the discretion that produced past disparities could shape who is diverted. On the market, diversion leaves supply untouched, so it would not be expected to change prices, purity or the dominance of fentanyl, and it adds no pressure on shipments that the iron law would link to higher potency. Its benefits would come from fewer criminal records and less contact with custody. An evaluation should ask whether, since 2022, police have given warnings and referrals at equal rates to Black, Indigenous and White people found with similar amounts.

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Final Knowledge Assessment

Final Assessment, this lesson: Drug Control and the War on Drugs (15 Questions)

Question 1: Which treaty first brought cocaine and heroin under international control?

The Hague Convention, signed on 23 January 1912, added cocaine and heroin to the controls on opium and morphine. The Shanghai resolutions are tempting because they came first, but they were non-binding and concerned opium.

Question 2: Canada's drug treatment courts and the diversion duties added by Bill C-5 both rely on which feature of the UN drug conventions?

All three conventions allow parties to provide education, treatment, rehabilitation and similar measures as alternatives to conviction or punishment for people who use drugs, and the 1988 Convention extends this to minor cases and to possession for personal use. Article 4(c) is tempting because it is central, but it concerns supply and was the basis of the INCB's objection to Canada's cannabis market.

Question 3: There are reasonable grounds to believe a substance poses a significant risk to public health or safety in Canada. Under the CDSA, who can add it to Schedule V, and for how long at first?

Section 60.1 allows the Minister of Health to add an item to Schedule V for up to one year, renewable for another year, and the 2026 amendment created an accelerated pathway for precursors. Parliament is tempting, but the point of Schedule V is to act faster than legislation.

Question 4: Between 2007 and 2017, Black people made up about 9 percent of federal custody admissions and 11 percent of admissions for an offence carrying a mandatory minimum. What is the representation ratio, and what does it show?

Dividing 11 by 9 gives 1.2, so Black people's share of minimum-penalty admissions was about 20 percent larger than their share of all admissions. The value 0.8 is tempting but divides the shares the wrong way round.

Question 5: Which body described Canada's Cannabis Act as "a violation of fundamental provisions of the 1961 Single Convention" when it came into force?

The INCB, which monitors treaty compliance, issued that statement on 17 October 2018. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs is tempting because it votes on scheduling, but it did not issue the statement; two years later it removed cannabis from Schedule IV.

Question 6: What is the main difference between how the United States Controlled Substances Act and Canada's CDSA place drugs in Schedules I to IV?

The United States Act defines each of its five schedules by criteria such as potential for abuse and accepted medical use, while Canada's Cabinet may amend Schedules I to IV when it considers this necessary in the public interest. The option crediting Canada with criteria is tempting, but those criteria belong to the American law.

Question 7: Harm Reduction International reported at least 1,212 executions for drug offences in 2025 and 615 in 2024. What was the percent increase?

The increase is (1,212 minus 615) divided by 615, which equals 0.97, or 97 percent. The value 197 percent is tempting because the 2025 figure is 197 percent of the 2024 figure; that number is a ratio, and the increase is the part above 100 percent.

Question 8: In the meta-analysis by Mitchell and colleagues (2012), adult drug courts were associated with recidivism of about 38 percent compared with 50 percent. What is the absolute reduction?

The absolute reduction is 50 minus 38, or 12 percentage points. The value 24 is tempting because it is the relative reduction (12 divided by 50 equals 24 percent), not a difference in percentage points.

Question 9: Which design limitation applies to both the Canadian drug treatment court recidivism study and the evaluation of Seattle's LEAD program?

Both used comparison groups that were not randomly allocated, so differences in outcomes could reflect differences between the people in each group. Self-report is tempting because it is a common weakness, but both studies measured official charges or arrests.

Question 10: The Single Convention required coca-leaf chewing to end within 25 years of its entry into force. Which later event shows this clause in conflict with a traditional practice?

Bolivia withdrew from the Single Convention in 2012 and rejoined in 2013 with a reservation allowing coca-leaf chewing, which too few parties opposed to block. The 2020 vote is tempting because it also shows a fracturing consensus, but it concerned cannabis.

Question 11: Werb and colleagues (2011) reviewed 15 studies of drug law enforcement and drug market violence. What did 14 of them report?

Fourteen of the 15 studies reported an adverse impact of enforcement on violence, and the authors concluded that disrupting drug markets can paradoxically increase violence. The options describing reduced violence are tempting because they match the intent of enforcement, but the review found the opposite.

Question 12: In the hypothetical market of Interactive 11.3, why does the price per unit of effect rise less than it would if no compact product existed?

In the model, enforcement adds a cost to every gram moved, which is spread over many more units of effect for the compact product, so suppliers switch to it and prices rise less. The first option is tempting, but the compact product is more expensive to make; it wins only once enforcement raises the cost of bulk.

Question 13: Which description fits the International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy (2019)?

The Guidelines restate how existing human rights law applies to drug policy and are co-sponsored by UNDP, WHO, OHCHR and UNAIDS; they call for halting executions and abolishing the death penalty for drug offences. The treaty option is tempting, but the Guidelines are not a new treaty.

Question 14: In British Columbia in 2025, which substance was detected most often among people who died of unregulated drug toxicity and received expedited testing?

The BC Coroners Service reported fentanyl in 69 percent and fluorofentanyl in 54 percent; Lesson 6 gave lower figures for cocaine and methamphetamine. Fluorofentanyl is tempting because it is a fentanyl analogue that was also common, but it was detected less often.

Question 15: A policymaker argues that more border seizures will make Canada's unregulated supply safer by making fentanyl scarce and expensive. Which evidence from this lesson most directly challenges that argument?

Werb and colleagues (2013) found that, in United States data from 1990 to 2007, prices fell and purity rose despite growing enforcement, and the iron law, a hypothesis supported mainly by historical evidence, predicts that pressure on shipments favours more potent products, which could make the supply less predictable. The repeal of minimums is tempting because it concerns enforcement, but it says nothing about market effects.
✦ Complete the final reflection above before submitting

Congratulations!

You have successfully completed this lesson: Drug Control and the War on Drugs.

You can now explain how the international drug control system was built and how substances are scheduled, trace the war on drugs in the United States and Canada, calculate quantity and representation ratios and purity-adjusted prices, weigh the evidence on drug treatment courts and police diversion, and use the iron law of prohibition to reason about how enforcement shapes drug markets.

Lesson 12 turns to the alternatives to prohibition. It examines Vancouver's Four Pillars and Canada's drug strategies, decriminalization in Portugal, Oregon and British Columbia, and the legal regulation of cannabis under Canada's 2018 Cannabis Act, and it closes the course by weighing prohibition, decriminalization and legal regulation against the Canadian evidence.

Reference

Glossary: Key Terms, People & Frameworks

📚 Reference page, available throughout the lesson

Definitions of the terms, laws, bodies and people introduced in this lesson, in the sense used here.

Core Concepts
Schedule A legal list of substances that receive a particular level of control; introduced internationally in 1931 and used today in the UN conventions and Canada's CDSA.
Precursor chemical A chemical used to make a controlled drug; precursors are listed in the tables of the 1988 Convention and in Schedules V and VI of the CDSA.
Reservation (treaty) A statement by which a state that joins a treaty excludes or modifies one of its provisions, as Bolivia did for coca-leaf chewing in 2013.
Fracturing consensus David Bewley-Taylor's description of a drug control regime in which agreement persists on many points while states diverge on non-medical use, harm reduction and cannabis.
War on drugs A historical policy term for the period of intensified drug enforcement that began in the United States in the early 1970s; its military metaphor framed drug use as an enemy.
Mandatory minimum penalty A minimum term of imprisonment that a judge must impose on conviction for an offence, whatever the circumstances of the case.
Quantity ratio The quantity of one form of a drug that triggers a penalty divided by the quantity of another form that triggers the same penalty, such as 100-to-1 for powder and crack cocaine.
Conditional sentence A sentence of imprisonment that a person serves in the community under conditions; Bill C-5 widened its availability in 2022.
Diversion Steering a person away from prosecution or imprisonment toward warnings, referrals, treatment or services, at any stage of the justice process.
Drug treatment court A court program in which people charged with offences linked to substance use, usually after a guilty plea, follow court-supervised treatment with regular hearings and drug testing.
Recidivism New offending, usually measured as new arrests, charges or convictions after a program or sentence.
Representation ratio A group's share of a justice-system population divided by its share of a comparison population; a value above 1 indicates overrepresentation.
Supply reduction Policies that aim to reduce drug availability through eradication, seizures, arrests of traffickers and border control.
Purity-adjusted price The street price of a drug divided by its purity, giving the price of one gram of pure drug.
Market violence Violence linked to competition and disputes in illegal drug markets, which cannot rely on courts or contracts.
Balloon effect UNODC's term for geographic displacement: suppressing drug production in one place makes it swell in another.
Substance displacement A shift by suppliers and users from a controlled drug to another with similar effects and weaker controls.
Policy displacement UNODC's term for the movement of resources toward enforcement and away from public health.
Iron law of prohibition The proposition, supported mainly by historical evidence, that the more intense the law enforcement, the more potent drugs become, because suppliers favour compact products.
Meta-analysis A statistical method that pools the results of many studies of the same question into an average effect.
Laws, Bodies, Frameworks & Tools
Shanghai Opium Commission (1909) The international meeting on the opium trade, held from 1 to 26 February 1909, that UNODC treats as the starting point of international drug control; its resolutions were non-binding.
Hague International Opium Convention (1912) The treaty, signed on 23 January 1912, that UNODC describes as the first international drug control treaty; it covered opium, morphine, cocaine and heroin.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) The UN treaty, in force from 1964, that limits narcotic drugs, coca and cannabis to medical and scientific purposes and created the INCB.
Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) The UN treaty, in force from 1976, that controls synthetic drugs such as amphetamines, hallucinogens and benzodiazepines.
Convention against Illicit Traffic (1988) The UN treaty, in force from 1990, that targets trafficking, money laundering and precursors and requires a possession offence subject to constitutional principles.
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) The UN policy-making body of 53 member states that votes on scheduling under the drug conventions and governs UNODC.
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) An independent, quasi-judicial body of 13 members that monitors the licit drug trade and treaty compliance.
WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD) A group of independent experts that reviews psychoactive substances and recommends whether to control them.
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) Canada's federal drug law of 1996, which lists controlled substances in schedules and sets offences and penalties.
Bill C-5 (2022) Federal legislation that repealed the drug mandatory minimums, widened conditional sentences and added diversion duties for simple possession.
International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy (2019) Guidelines co-sponsored by UN agencies that set out how human rights law applies to drug policy, including the right to life and freedom from arbitrary detention.
Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) A Seattle program, launched in October 2011, in which police refer people suspected of low-level drug or sex work offences to case management in place of booking.
Key People
Charles Henry Brent Episcopal bishop of the Philippines who lobbied for and presided over the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909.
William Lyon Mackenzie King Canadian official and later prime minister whose 1908 report led to the Opium Act and who represented Canada at Shanghai in 1909.
Michelle Alexander American civil rights lawyer and author of The New Jim Crow (2010), which argues that drug-driven mass incarceration functions as racialized social control.
David Bewley-Taylor Author of International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured (2012), an analysis of divergence within the UN drug control regime.
Richard Cowan Author of a 1986 essay in National Review, "How the narcs created crack," that named the iron law of prohibition.
Akwasi Owusu-Bempah University of Toronto criminologist whose study with Alex Luscombe (2021) found racial disparities in cannabis arrests in five Canadian cities.
Dan Werb Lead author of a 2013 audit of government surveillance data that found falling drug prices and rising purity despite growing enforcement, and of a 2011 systematic review linking enforcement with drug market violence.
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