# Lesson 11: Drug Control and the War on Drugs

*Companion-podcast transcript • Sarah & Kiffer*  
*Office Hours episode to listen to after working through the lesson*

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**Sarah:** Welcome back to Office Hours. I'm Sarah.

**Kiffer:** And I'm Kiffer. This conversation touches on racism in enforcement, incarceration, killings in a drug campaign and the death penalty, and the support lines listed in the lesson are there for anyone who wants them. For Lesson eleven, on drug control and the war on drugs, the heroin market in the United States gives us a long run of figures on prices and enforcement.

**Sarah:** Between 1990 and 2007, governments kept putting more money into enforcement aimed at the drug supply. Over those same years, the price of heroin there, adjusted for inflation and for purity, fell by eighty-one percent.

**Kiffer:** And the average purity of heroin there rose by sixty percent. Enforcement aimed at supply is meant to make drugs scarce, which should push the price up and the purity down. Both numbers moved the other way.

**Sarah:** So how should we read a trend like that? My first instinct is to say that enforcement doesn't work.

**Kiffer:** The data can carry part of that conclusion. They rule out the claim that heroin, cocaine or cannabis became scarcer and more expensive in those markets while enforcement grew. What they can't tell you is what prices would have done with less enforcement, because production methods, trade routes and demand all changed too. A trend tells you what happened. Measuring the effect of a policy needs a comparison with what would have happened without it.

**Sarah:** And comparing prices across years only works once you adjust for purity. I want to try one where both numbers move at once. Hypothetically, the street price goes from eighty dollars a gram to ninety-six dollars, and over the same period the purity goes from twenty percent to forty percent. Did the price of the drug itself go up or down, and by how much?

**Kiffer:** Before you answer, let's give everyone a chance to work it out. Pause the audio if you'd like more time. Take a few seconds.

*(Pause)*

**Sarah:** The street price went up by twenty percent. Purity doubled, and doubling the purity on its own halves the price per pure gram, which is a fall of fifty percent. So twenty up and fifty down gives a fall of thirty percent.

**Kiffer:** Check that with the actual dollar amounts before you commit to it.

**Sarah:** Okay. Before, it's eighty divided by 0.2, which is four hundred dollars per pure gram. After, it's ninety-six divided by 0.4, which is two hundred forty. The change is two hundred forty minus four hundred, divided by four hundred, which is minus 0.4. That's a fall of forty percent, so my thirty was wrong.

**Kiffer:** Right, and the reason is that percent changes multiply. A twenty percent rise means multiplying by 1.2, and halving means multiplying by 0.5. And 1.2 times 0.5 is 0.6, so the price per pure gram ends at sixty percent of where it started. Adding the percentages only comes close when both changes are small.

**Sarah:** So a street price that rose by a fifth can hide a forty percent fall in the price of the drug itself. That brings us to the iron law of prohibition, the idea Richard Cowan named in 1986, that drugs in an illegal market tend to become more potent as enforcement grows more intense. Is it a law in the sense that physics has laws?

**Kiffer:** I'd call it a hypothesis about direction, supported mainly by historical evidence. The reasoning is about bulk. Enforcement targets shipments, and Lesson five put fentanyl at about twenty-five to fifty times as potent as heroin by mass, so a supplier can move the same amount of opioid, counted in heroin equivalents, in a package twenty-five to fifty times lighter. The historical case fits too. Under alcohol prohibition in the United States, spirits went from around forty percent of spending on alcohol before Prohibition to almost ninety percent soon after it began.

**Sarah:** Then why not treat it as settled?

**Kiffer:** The same cases fit other explanations. Cheaper chemical synthesis could make fentanyl attractive to producers even if enforcement stayed flat, and enforcement, production methods and demand all changed at once. A strong test would compare places where pressure on shipments rose with places where it held steady, and the evidence we have describes associations more than measured effects. So I hold the direction with more confidence than the size.

**Sarah:** It matters for a real Canadian policy, too. Since March 2026, a temporary, faster pathway lets the Minister of Health add precursor chemicals, the chemicals used to make drugs, to Schedule five of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

**Kiffer:** That's a good place to apply both ideas. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has noted that substance displacement happens with precursor chemicals as well, so one prediction is that producers will switch to chemicals that aren't listed yet. The measure hasn't been evaluated. I'd want an evaluation that follows what turns up in drug checking and toxicology over several years.

**Sarah:** Question two. In 2010, the United States cut the crack and powder cocaine quantity ratio from one hundred to one to about eighteen to one. Yet in fiscal year 2025, seventy-three percent of people sentenced federally for crack trafficking were Black. Why didn't the reform change who was sentenced?

**Kiffer:** The ratio sets how much crack triggers a mandatory minimum, which shapes how severe the sentence is once someone is convicted. Who gets arrested and charged with a crack offence in the first place depends on earlier decisions by police and prosecutors. The Sentencing Commission found that the reform reduced the gap between crack and powder sentences and appears to have led to fewer federal crack prosecutions. Yet in the years just before and after it, more than three quarters of people sentenced for crack trafficking were Black. The reform narrowed the gap in penalties and left the makeup of the caseload much as it was.

**Sarah:** Here's one for everyone listening. In 2002, the Sentencing Commission recommended a ratio of no more than twenty to one. With the powder threshold for the five-year minimum at five hundred grams, what crack threshold would meet that recommendation? Take a few seconds.

*(Pause)*

**Kiffer:** Five hundred divided by twenty is twenty-five, so the tempting answer is a crack threshold of at most twenty-five grams. Check the direction with an extreme case. A crack threshold of one gram would give a ratio of five hundred to one. A smaller crack threshold makes the ratio bigger, so a ratio of no more than twenty to one needs a crack threshold of at least twenty-five grams. The 2010 law chose twenty-eight grams, which gives about 17.9, just inside the recommendation.

**Sarah:** So when the number you're solving for sits on the bottom of a ratio, raising it lowers the ratio. Where does Michelle Alexander's argument fit into this? She described mass incarceration, driven largely by the war on drugs, as a system of racialized social control that works much like Jim Crow. The legal scholar James Forman Jr. pushed back. He argued that the analogy oversimplifies how mass incarceration began, overlooks support for punitive crime policy among some Black Americans, and focuses on drug offences when people convicted of them made up only about a quarter of American prisoners.

**Kiffer:** It helps to separate the measurement from the interpretation. The sentencing data support one part of her argument directly: the severe federal penalties for crack fell overwhelmingly on Black Americans. The comparison with Jim Crow is an interpretation of history, and that's the part Forman's critique addresses.

**Sarah:** So someone can accept the sentencing data and still argue about the analogy.

**Kiffer:** Yes, and a careful reader can say which part of a claim rests on data and which rests on interpretation. That skill matters even more in Canada, where the data are thinner.

**Sarah:** Question three. In the Correctional Investigator's report for 2023 to 2024, Indigenous people made up 33.1 percent of people in federal custody, for all offences combined. In the 2021 census, they made up 5.0 percent of the population. That's a representation ratio of 6.6. What does that number tell us?

**Kiffer:** It measures the size of a gap at the end of a long chain: where police patrol and whom they stop, charging, bail, conviction and sentencing. It also reflects structural conditions, including colonial policies, racism and poverty, which HSCI 214 develops. What it can't tell you is where along the chain the gap grew.

**Sarah:** So how would anyone find out where it grew?

**Kiffer:** By comparing each stage with the one before it. Let's build a hypothetical chain with made-up numbers. Suppose a group makes up four percent of adults and four percent of adults who use drugs. It makes up twelve percent of people police stop and search for drugs, twelve percent of people charged, and sixteen percent of people sent to custody. What's the overall ratio, and at which stage does most of the gap enter? Take a few seconds.

*(Pause)*

**Sarah:** The overall ratio is sixteen divided by four, which is four. For the stages, I'd compare each share with the share at the stage before it. Drug use is four divided by four, which is one. Stops are twelve divided by four, which is three. Charges are twelve divided by twelve, which is one. Custody is sixteen divided by twelve, about 1.33. So most of the gap enters at the stop.

**Kiffer:** And notice that the stage ratios multiply back to the total. One times three times one times 1.33 is four. Someone who saw only the final ratio of four might blame the courts, when in this hypothetical the largest step comes from who gets stopped.

**Sarah:** But that depends on the benchmark. What if the group used drugs more often than other adults?

**Kiffer:** Then part of the gap moves. Keep everything the same, except that the group is six percent of adults who use drugs. The use stage becomes six divided by four, or 1.5, and the stop stage becomes twelve divided by six, or two. The total is still four, but now a piece of it sits at the use stage. That's why the choice of comparison population matters so much.

**Sarah:** For cannabis in Canada, researchers have checked that benchmark. A national online survey in 2019 and 2020 found that Black and Indigenous respondents were much more likely than White respondents to report a conviction for a cannabis offence, and the difference remained after accounting for cannabis use and socioeconomic factors.

**Kiffer:** Then the authors also adjusted for neighbourhood deprivation, and only the difference for Black respondents remained. That step needs care. Choosing where police patrol is part of enforcement, so adjusting for neighbourhood may remove part of the very pathway you want to measure. An adjusted result answers a narrower question, and a reader should know which question it is.

**Sarah:** Which brings in the 2022 change. Since Bill C-5, police must consider taking no action, giving a warning or making a referral before charging someone with simple possession.

**Kiffer:** That's a change at the first stage of the chain, the stage where our hypothetical put the largest step. The duty is to consider those options, and an officer's failure to consider them doesn't invalidate a charge. So the useful question is whether warnings and referrals go at equal rates to Black, Indigenous and White people found with similar amounts. Answering it needs race-based justice data, and Canada collects little of it.

**Sarah:** Question four. I often hear that the UN drug treaties force Canada to criminalize people who use drugs. How true is that?

**Kiffer:** It's partly true. Article three, paragraph two of the 1988 Convention asks each party to make possession for personal consumption a criminal offence, subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system. All three conventions also allow treatment, education, rehabilitation and aftercare as alternatives to conviction or punishment. The older two allow them when people who use drugs commit an offence, and the 1988 Convention allows them for personal possession and in minor cases. Canada's drug treatment courts and the 2022 diversion duties both use that room, and Lesson twelve takes up how far the phrase about constitutional principles stretches.

**Sarah:** Then here's a related one for everyone. On 2 December 2020, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs voted twenty-seven to twenty-five, with one abstention, to remove cannabis from Schedule four of the Single Convention. Did that vote make Canada's legal cannabis market consistent with the treaty? Take a few seconds.

*(Pause)*

**Kiffer:** It didn't. Schedule four is the most restrictive category, where cannabis had been listed alongside heroin for fifty-nine years. Cannabis stayed in Schedule one, and Article four c of the Single Convention limits the production, trade and use of drugs to medical and scientific purposes. A legal market for non-medical cannabis licenses exactly what that article excludes, which is why the International Narcotics Control Board called the Cannabis Act a violation of fundamental provisions of the convention when it came into force in October 2018.

**Sarah:** And Canada stayed a party anyway. Yet when Bolivia asked to rejoin the Single Convention with a reservation allowing coca-leaf chewing, Canada was one of fifteen countries that objected. Sixty-one objections, one third of the one hundred eighty-three parties, would have blocked the reservation. Only fifteen came, and Bolivia rejoined in February 2013.

**Kiffer:** It's a useful contrast. Bolivia used the treaty's own procedure to carve out a traditional practice, while Canada stayed a party in 2018 despite the Board's statement. Both cases fit the idea of a fractured consensus, with the treaties bending while they stay in force.

**Sarah:** The treaties also leave the severity of punishment largely to each government. That's how one system can include Canada's diversion duties and the death penalty. Harm Reduction International counted at least one thousand two hundred twelve executions for drug offences in 2025, not counting China, Vietnam and North Korea, where secrecy prevents a count.

**Kiffer:** That's where human rights standards come in. The International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy state that drug offences don't meet the threshold of the most serious crimes, the only crimes for which the death penalty may be imposed where it still exists.

**Sarah:** And the Philippine case has reached an international court.

**Kiffer:** In April 2026, the International Criminal Court confirmed three counts of crimes against humanity in its case concerning former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, and committed him to trial. The charges concern killings and attempted killings alleged to have been committed in the context of the anti-drug campaign. Confirming charges is a step toward trial and involves no finding of guilt. As of October 2026, the trial is scheduled to open on 30 November, and he has not been convicted.

**Sarah:** Okay, here's where we disagree, and it's about drug treatment courts. I think they've earned a place, and I think the evidence for them is stronger than critics allow.

**Kiffer:** Go ahead and make the strongest case you can for them.

**Sarah:** The largest meta-analysis pooled one hundred fifty-four evaluations. For adult courts, the average effect was equivalent to recidivism falling from fifty percent among comparable non-participants to about thirty-eight percent among participants, and the effect lasted at least three years. Only three of the adult-court evaluations were randomized, and the authors summarized all three as finding reductions. In Canada, a Statistics Canada study for the Department of Justice compared people released from federally funded courts with two thousand four hundred thirty non-participants matched on age, criminal history and risk. After the first year, participants had a thirty-six percent lower likelihood of any new charge. And a study of the Vancouver court found larger reductions for women and Indigenous participants.

**Kiffer:** Those are real findings, though the three randomized trials varied, and one found almost no effect in its first year. The Canadian study has a strength that's easy to miss. It counted everyone released from the courts, including people who didn't complete. My concern is with the rest of the picture. Participants have to plead guilty to enter, and in the federal program's 2021 evaluation, about one third of the one thousand fifty-three participants completed. In the first year, participants were more likely than the matched group to be charged, often for breaching court conditions.

**Sarah:** Some of that comes from the court watching people more closely.

**Kiffer:** That's part of it, and those charges are still a real cost to the people who receive them. A 2015 critique for the Open Society Foundations raised more problems. It reported that the United States Government Accountability Office had judged fewer than twenty percent of two hundred sixty drug court evaluations to have sound methods. Citing a meta-analysis of nineteen American studies, it argued that participants didn't spend less time incarcerated overall, because people who didn't complete often received long sentences after their guilty plea. It also criticized sanctions for relapse and some judges' refusal to allow methadone or buprenorphine.

**Sarah:** Those are fair points, and the diversion evidence is thinner. The evaluation of Seattle's Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion program, LEAD, covered three hundred eighteen people in one city, and it wasn't randomized. LEAD participants had fifty-eight percent lower odds of arrest over the longer term, and that figure is easy to overread. Odds are the chance that something happens divided by the chance that it doesn't. Suppose, hypothetically, that half the comparison group were arrested. Their odds are one. Fifty-eight percent lower odds is 0.42, which works out to a chance of 0.42 divided by 1.42, about thirty percent.

**Kiffer:** So in that hypothetical, arrests fall from fifty percent to about thirty, a drop of twenty percentage points, or about forty percent of the starting level. That's still a large effect, and you're right that it comes from a non-randomized study in one city. That's the strongest point on your side.

**Sarah:** So how do you compare two literatures that both have weak spots?

**Kiffer:** Here's the check I'd apply to both, with made-up numbers. Suppose a court admits three hundred people and one hundred complete. During follow-up, twenty of the completers get a new charge, and so do one hundred ten of the two hundred who leave early. What would a report on graduates show, and what happens when you count everyone?

**Sarah:** For graduates alone, it's twenty out of one hundred, so twenty percent. For everyone, it's one hundred thirty out of three hundred, about forty-three percent. Compared with a group at fifty percent, the first looks dramatic and the second looks modest.

**Kiffer:** And the Canadian study shows a real version of that pattern. Counting everyone, participants had the thirty-six percent lower likelihood of a new charge after the first year. Completers alone were forty-nine percent less likely, and the study cautioned that completers couldn't be matched to a comparison group and that many non-completers probably left because they reoffended. Results for graduates describe a selected group.

**Sarah:** So where do you land?

**Kiffer:** On this evidence, I'd put diversion first for people whose main contact with police is possession or other low-level offences, because it acts before a guilty plea and a record. Its evidence is thinner, so I'd build an evaluation into any expansion. I'd keep courts for people already facing custody for offences linked to a substance use disorder, as long as they guarantee access to methadone and buprenorphine and report what happens to everyone who enters.

**Sarah:** I'd weigh the court evidence more heavily than you do, because it's larger and includes randomized trials, and I'd want stronger evidence on diversion before moving money toward it. We agree on the practical rule, though. When you read an evaluation of any justice-system alternative, check whether it counts everyone who entered, including people who left early, and whether it reports total time in custody along with new charges.

**Kiffer:** Let's pull it together with three things to take away.

**Sarah:** First, a trend can rule out a prediction without measuring an effect. Prices fell and purity rose while enforcement grew, which rules out the claim that drugs became scarcer in those markets, and it leaves open how much enforcement changed prices.

**Kiffer:** Second, a ratio at the end of a chain hides where the gap entered. Break representation ratios into stages, and say which comparison population you're using.

**Sarah:** And third, read the treaty text and the evaluation design before the headline. The conventions leave room for alternatives to punishment, and a fair evaluation of those alternatives counts everyone who entered.

**Kiffer:** If you'd like more practice, rework the hypothetical justice chain from this episode with the group at six percent of adults who use drugs and eighteen percent of people in custody, and find the stage where the gap grows most.

**Sarah:** Next time, it's Lesson twelve, Alternatives to Prohibition and an Integration of the Course, where decriminalization and legal regulation are compared with prohibition using the Canadian evidence.

**Kiffer:** Take care, everyone.

**Sarah:** See you in Lesson twelve.
