# Lesson 9: Environmental Health: Indoor, Built, and Natural Environments

*Companion-podcast transcript • Sarah & Kiffer*  
*Office Hours episode to listen to after working through the lesson*

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**Sarah:** Welcome back to Office Hours. I'm Sarah.

**Kiffer:** And I'm Kiffer. This episode goes with Lesson nine, Environmental Health: Indoor, Built, and Natural Environments.

**Sarah:** It's meant for listening once you've worked through the lesson. We'll bring in some perspective on how these ideas are used in practice, offer some critique, work through the questions students tend to find thorny in environmental health, and do a few extra worked examples, including some that are harder than the ones on the lesson page.

**Kiffer:** There are a few places in this episode where we'll ask you to work something out before we give the answer. When that happens, you'll hear a few seconds of quiet. Pause the audio if you'd like more time to think it through.

**Sarah:** Here's what we'll cover. First, what an air quality guideline number actually tells you, and why the safe level keeps moving. Second, why radon goes untested when the fix is cheap, which is where Kiffer and I disagree. Third, how to divide the blame when two exposures, asbestos and smoking, act together. Fourth, whether walkable neighbourhoods make people healthier or simply attract healthier people. And fifth, why seven deaths in Walkerton changed the law faster than six hundred and nineteen deaths in the heat dome.

**Kiffer:** Question one. What does a guideline number tell you? The WHO cut its annual PM2.5 guideline from ten micrograms per cubic metre in 2005 to five in 2021. Canada's current standard for the annual average is 8.8. Students often read numbers like these as the line between safe air and unsafe air.

**Sarah:** And the lesson pushes back on that reading. The guideline moved because bigger studies with longer follow-up kept finding harm at lower and lower levels. If a line can be cut in half in sixteen years, it was a judgement about the evidence at the time, and the biology didn't change in between.

**Kiffer:** Right. For fine particles, studies keep finding effects at the lowest concentrations they can measure. So a guideline marks the point where an expert body decided the remaining risk was acceptable, given the evidence and what it would take to go lower. That's partly a value judgement, and reasonable bodies set it in different places, which is why Canada sits at 8.8 and the WHO at five.

**Sarah:** There's a second thing every guideline number carries, which is its averaging time, and this is where I see students trip. The WHO has an annual guideline of five and a separate twenty-four-hour guideline of fifteen. Canada's standards have an annual value of 8.8 and a twenty-four-hour value of twenty-seven.

**Kiffer:** So here's one to try. During the worst smoke of 2023, PM2.5 in some cities passed three hundred micrograms per cubic metre, and a figure like that has been described as sixty times the WHO guideline. Which guideline should a reading of three hundred be compared with, and how many times over is it? Take a few seconds.

*(Pause)*

**Sarah:** Three hundred divided by five is sixty, but five is the annual guideline, an average over a whole year. A smoky day should be compared with a short-term value. Three hundred divided by the WHO's twenty-four-hour guideline of fifteen is twenty. Compared with Canada's twenty-four-hour standard of twenty-seven, it's about eleven times.

**Kiffer:** And if the three hundred was a peak hourly reading, that's a shorter period again than a daily average, so even twenty times is a generous comparison. Twenty times the daily guideline is still extreme air. The general rule is that both numbers in a comparison need the same averaging time.

**Sarah:** Let me try the other direction, because smoke also changes the annual number. Here's a made-up town. On forty days a year it sits in wildfire smoke at sixty micrograms per cubic metre. The other three hundred and twenty-five days are fairly clean, at six. What's its annual average? Sixty plus six is sixty-six, divided by two is thirty-three. So the annual average is thirty-three.

**Kiffer:** Before you go on, check whether thirty-three makes sense. The town spends almost the whole year at six micrograms, so how could its average end up five times higher than that?

**Sarah:** You're right, it can't. I averaged the two levels as though the town spent half the year in smoke. It spends forty days out of three hundred and sixty-five. I need to weight each level by its number of days. Forty times sixty is two thousand four hundred. Three hundred and twenty-five times six is one thousand nine hundred and fifty. Together that's four thousand three hundred and fifty, and divided by three hundred and sixty-five days, that's about 11.9.

**Kiffer:** That's believable, and look at what it says. Without the smoke, the town sits at six, a little above the WHO's five and below Canada's 8.8. Forty smoky days push its annual average to about twelve, over both. More than half of the year's total exposure comes from those forty days.

**Sarah:** Which is awkward for regulation, because the usual tools act on traffic, industry and wood stoves, and a town can't regulate a fire burning hundreds of kilometres away.

**Kiffer:** That's the gap the lesson points to. The guideline system was built around sources that a government can control. With smoke, much of the protection happens at home and in public buildings, through filtration and clean-air spaces, which brings us indoors.

**Sarah:** Question two, radon. Health Canada estimates that radon causes about sixteen percent of lung cancer deaths in Canada, which is roughly three thousand two hundred deaths a year, and calls it the leading cause of lung cancer in people who have never smoked. Testing is cheap. Health Canada recommends a long-term test lasting three months, ideally in the fall or winter. So why do so few people test?

**Kiffer:** Let's put numbers on it with a made-up town of four thousand homes. Suppose seven percent of the homes are above the guideline of two hundred becquerels per cubic metre, which is inside the lesson's range of five to ten percent. And suppose eight percent of homeowners test, and whether they test has nothing to do with their radon level. How many high-radon homes does the town know about, and how many does it miss? Take a few seconds.

*(Pause)*

**Sarah:** Seven percent of four thousand is two hundred and eighty high homes. Eight percent of four thousand is three hundred and twenty homes tested. If testing has nothing to do with radon, seven percent of those three hundred and twenty are high, which is about twenty-two. So the town knows about twenty-two high homes, and about two hundred and fifty-eight go unknown.

**Kiffer:** Right. More than nine in ten high-radon homes stay hidden. Even if all twenty-two get fixed, at the lesson's figure of two to three thousand dollars each, the town has acted on less than a tenth of its problem.

**Sarah:** And each household experiences the risk as small. Most people in a high-radon house won't get lung cancer from it, the gas can't be seen or smelled, and any cancer comes decades later.

**Kiffer:** That's the pattern the lesson describes. The risk is invisible, slow, rare for any one person, and left to each homeowner. The lesson argues that risks with that shape need regulatory backstops, such as testing at the point of sale or requirements in new construction.

**Sarah:** This is where we disagree. I'm wary of a mandatory test at the point of sale. The test Health Canada recommends runs three months, and many home sales close faster than that. Short tests are less reliable, so a mandate could produce a lot of paperwork and some false reassurance. I'd put the money into free long-term test kits through libraries and public health units, and into helping lower-income owners pay for mitigation.

**Kiffer:** Those are good programs, and I'd keep them. My view is that voluntary programs mostly reach people who are already inclined to act, which in our made-up town is the eight percent. I'd support requirements where the timing works and where the people exposed don't control the building: rental housing, schools, child care centres, and new construction, where the piping for a radon system can be put in cheaply during the build.

**Sarah:** Renters are a fair point. A tenant can't install a depressurization system in a landlord's basement.

**Kiffer:** And that equity issue runs through the indoor hazards in this lesson. Lead paint, mould and radon all concentrate in older housing, people with less money are more likely to live there, and many of them have little control over repairs.

**Sarah:** So where do we land?

**Kiffer:** I think we can agree on how to judge any radon policy. Count how many high-radon homes actually get found and brought below the guideline. Handing out kits is a step along the way, and the share of high homes fixed is the result that protects people.

**Sarah:** Agreed. Judge a program by homes fixed, and pay special attention to the people who don't control their own building.

**Kiffer:** Question three, which is our harder example. Asbestos and smoking. Their combined effect on lung cancer is described in the lesson as much more than additive. Let's see what that means with made-up round numbers. Take people with neither exposure as the baseline, with a relative risk of one. Asbestos alone gives a relative risk of five. Smoking alone gives ten. Workers with both exposures have a relative risk of fifty.

**Sarah:** Those numbers are made up, but they're close to the pattern in the classic studies of insulation workers. One widely reproduced table puts asbestos alone at about five, smoking alone at about eleven, and both together at about fifty-three.

**Kiffer:** Right. So first, what relative risk would we expect for people with both exposures if the two effects simply added together?

**Sarah:** Each exposure adds its own excess on top of the baseline. Asbestos adds four and smoking adds nine, so one plus four plus nine is fourteen. The fifty we see is far above fourteen, and it's exactly five times ten, which is what multiplying the two would give.

**Kiffer:** Now the trap. A worker who smoked and worked with asbestos develops lung cancer. A union says asbestos caused it, and the employer says smoking did. Among workers with both exposures, what share of the excess risk would be removed by eliminating asbestos alone, and what share by eliminating smoking alone? Take a few seconds.

*(Pause)*

**Sarah:** The excess for both is fifty minus one, which is forty-nine. Remove asbestos and they drop to the smokers' risk of ten, so forty of the forty-nine is gone. That's about eighty-two percent. Remove smoking and they drop to five, so forty-five of the forty-nine is gone, about ninety-two percent. Wait. Eighty-two plus ninety-two is a hundred and seventy-four percent. That can't be a split of the blame.

**Kiffer:** That's the trap, and you caught it. When causes interact, the shares they explain don't have to add to a hundred percent. Both of your answers are correct for their own question. Removing either exposure would prevent most of the excess cases in this group, because most of those cases needed both exposures.

**Sarah:** So the question of which one caused a particular cancer doesn't have a single answer.

**Kiffer:** For a case in this group, it doesn't. Here's one way to see the pieces. Of the forty-nine excess, four would be there from asbestos alone, and nine from smoking alone. The other thirty-six exist only because the two exposures occur together.

**Sarah:** That matters for prevention. Quitting smoking is especially valuable for someone with past asbestos exposure, and controlling asbestos protects smokers most of all. It also means neither side in a compensation dispute can claim the case belongs entirely to the other.

**Kiffer:** Radon and smoking also combine to raise risk, and Health Canada notes that people who smoke and are exposed to radon have an even higher risk of lung cancer. So the same reasoning applies in a high-radon home.

**Sarah:** Question four. People who live in walkable neighbourhoods walk more and have lower rates of obesity, on average. Does the neighbourhood cause that, or do people who like walking choose those neighbourhoods?

**Kiffer:** Probably some of both, and the hard part is working out how much of each. That selection problem is why the lesson leans on quasi-experiments such as new transit lines. Here are made-up numbers. A neighbourhood gets a new rapid transit station. Before it opens, adults there walk an average of twenty minutes a day. Two years later, it's twenty-six. A similar neighbourhood with no new station went from twenty-one minutes to twenty-three over the same two years. How many extra minutes of walking would you credit to the station? Take a few seconds.

*(Pause)*

**Sarah:** The tempting answer is six minutes. But the comparison neighbourhood went up two minutes with no station, perhaps because of weather or a citywide trend. So I subtract that. Six minus two is four. The station is associated with about four extra minutes of walking a day.

**Kiffer:** That's the difference-in-differences logic from the lesson. What does the answer assume about the two neighbourhoods?

**Sarah:** That without the station, the first neighbourhood would have changed in the same way as the comparison one. If the station area was already changing, with new residents who walk more, some of that four minutes is still selection.

**Kiffer:** Exactly, and that's a real concern with transit. New stations can raise rents and change who lives nearby. A study that follows the same people over time, as well as the same place, guards against that. There's an equity side too. If the people who'd benefit most are priced out, the health gains go to the newcomers.

**Sarah:** Four minutes a day sounds like a small effect.

**Kiffer:** For one person, it is small. Across tens of thousands of residents, every day for years, a small shift in a whole population's behaviour adds up. That's the general logic of the built environment, which produces modest effects on very large numbers of people at once.

**Sarah:** Question five. In May 2000, contaminated water in Walkerton, Ontario killed seven people and made more than two thousand three hundred ill. The inquiry led by Justice Dennis O'Connor was followed by Ontario's Safe Drinking Water Act in 2002. In the 2021 heat dome, the BC Coroners Service counted six hundred and nineteen heat-related deaths between June twenty-fifth and July first, and Lytton reached 49.6 degrees, the highest temperature ever recorded in Canada. Why did seven deaths lead to faster reform?

**Kiffer:** Acute events have a clear cause, identifiable people responsible, and an end. In Walkerton, the inquiry found that manure spread on a nearby farm had contaminated Well 5, that continuous chlorine and turbidity monitors at the well would have prevented the outbreak, and that operators had made false entries in their records. Each failure had a name attached and a fix that a legislature could write into law.

**Sarah:** And the heat dome's underlying cause is spread across decades of emissions, with no single decision to reverse. A rapid attribution study found that heat like that would have been virtually impossible without human-caused climate change, but that finding doesn't point to any one office or official.

**Kiffer:** I'd add a critique of the comparison, though. The heat dome deaths do have nearer causes that someone can act on. The coroners' review found that ninety-eight percent of the deaths happened indoors, fifty-six percent of the people lived alone, and about two thirds were seventy or older. Most lacked access to cooler spaces. Those are housing and social isolation problems as much as climate problems.

**Sarah:** That's a fair point, and it shows one way public health can make a chronic harm visible to decision makers, by breaking it into pieces that someone can own. Cooling standards for housing, check-in programs for older people living alone, and heat alert systems are specific actions with specific owners.

**Kiffer:** And the federal National Adaptation Strategy from 2023 set targets for eighty percent of health regions to have measures in place to protect people from extreme heat by 2026, and for heat deaths to be eliminated by 2040. Those targets give the chronic problem something closer to a deadline.

**Sarah:** Flint sits somewhere between the two kinds of crisis. The city switched to Flint River water in April 2014, without the corrosion control that keeps lead from leaching out of old pipes. Residents complained about the water for more than a year before officials took them seriously. The harm was serious, but slow, and mostly invisible until children's blood was tested.

**Kiffer:** Which suggests the speed of the response also depends on who is harmed, and on whether officials believe them. The lesson calls that environmental racism, and Flint, a majority-Black city under state-appointed emergency management, is its clearest example.

**Sarah:** And the question applies close to home. Drinking water safety in Indigenous communities in Canada is still the subject of federal investment and ongoing advocacy, so it's worth asking whose complaints get dismissed whenever an environmental problem goes unaddressed for a long time.

**Kiffer:** Let's pull it together with three things to take away from this episode on environmental health.

**Sarah:** First, a guideline is a policy line drawn across a risk that continues below it, and every guideline has an averaging time. Compare a reading with the guideline that matches its time period.

**Kiffer:** Second, when two exposures multiply each other, as asbestos and smoking do, the shares of blame can add to more than one hundred percent, and removing either exposure prevents most of the cases among people who had both.

**Sarah:** And third, environmental risks that are invisible, slow and left to individuals, like radon, call for structural responses, and those responses should be judged by who actually ends up protected, with attention to renters and lower-income households.

**Kiffer:** If you'd like more practice, rework the smoke-season town from this episode with sixty smoky days in place of forty, and check that your answer makes sense before you trust it.

**Sarah:** Next time, it's Lesson ten, Occupational Health and Worker Safety, where Irving Selikoff's insulation workers come back, along with the question of who carries the risks of work.

**Kiffer:** Thanks for working through the numbers with us, and for checking each answer before trusting it. Take care, everyone.

**Sarah:** See you in Lesson ten.
